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Reviving Proxy Marriage 
Andrea B. Carroll∗ 
Ask people to identify the most important event in their lives and their answers bear an 
overwhelming resemblance.  The day of their marriage ranks near the top of the list for virtually 
all.1  Entry into the marital relationship is a decision we approach with much contemplation and 
reflection.2  Typically the decision is not made whimsically.  Indeed, popular culture has 
admonished us that “only fools rush in,” a virtual axiom in today’s society.3  Nonetheless, 
American states recognize without exception that marriage is merely a contract.4  It creates 
myriad rights and responsibilities5—essentially conferring a status6—but the parties’ relationship 
is at base nothing more than a contractual one. 
Still, modern society has elevated the marriage contract above all others.  This distinction 
has overwhelmingly focused on the very personal nature of the marital relationship, a feature 
nonexistent in the arms-length contractual dealings with which we are accustomed to working 
when applying contract law.7  As a result, marriage is subject to a number of requirements, even 
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Spaht, Lucy McGough, Keith Rowley and the participants at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas School of Law 
Spring Conference on Contracts for valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this piece.  I am also grateful to the LSU 
Law Center for its generous research support.  Casey Faucon (LSU Law Center Class of 2010) and Laura Pryor 
(LSU Law Center Class of 2011) provided excellent research assistance. 
1 See Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me: Only Marriage Can Bring a Gay Person Home, TIME, Feb. 
16, 2004, § 7. 
2 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VIR. L. REV. 1225, 1254–55 (1998).  
3 ELVIS PRESLEY, Fools Rush In, on ELVIS NOW (1971).  
4 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 4 (1970).  See generally SCHILLEBEECKX, MARRIAGE, HUMAN REALITY AND SAVING
MYSTERY 388 (1965) (contractual basis of marriage came from the Roman consensus idea of marriage adopted by 
the Roman Catholic Church).  
5 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1(a) (1948). See also Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, I Gave Him the 
Best Years of My Life, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 272 (1987) (“Even seemingly vague and poetic marriage vows imply, 
yet conceal, a set of rights and obligations that are generally understood by the parties.”). 
6 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1(b) (1948) (“Marriage is generally considered a civil contract differing in notable respects 
from ordinary contracts, but it is also and especially a status or personal relation in which the state is deeply 
concerned and over which the state exercises exclusive dominion.”).  
7 Id. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 3 (6th ed. 1881) (“While the contract remains a mere agreement to marry, 
it is not essentially different from other executory contracts. . . . But when it is executed in what the law accepts as a 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596862
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at the level of contractual formation, which are unknown to the general law of contract.8  With 
the exception of the thirteen American jurisdictions allowing common law marriage,9 spouses 
must participate in person in a formal marriage ceremony at which they express their free 
consent and affirm their intent to undertake the marital relationship, with all the rights and duties 
it entails.10  Typically, a qualified officiant must preside11 and witnesses must be present to 
solidify the union.12  No other contract is subjected to as high an entry requirement—a solemn 
ceremony—as is marriage.13  Moreover, the application of one of the most fundamental doctrines 
of contract law, namely, that a contracting party need not formally enter into the contractual 
relationship himself but may instead designate an agent to act on his behalf,14 is generally viewed 
as inapplicable to the marital relationship.15  So-called “proxy marriages,” then, whereby one 
valid marriage, its nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status.”). See also Scott & Scott, supra 
note 2, at 1248. See generally Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
8 See id. at 1289. See also Bishop v. Britain Investment Co., 129 S.W. 668 (Mo. 1910) (“[W]hile we speak of 
marriage as a civil contract, yet that is a narrow view of it. The consensus of opinion in civilized nations is that 
marriage is something more than a dry contract. It is a contract different from all others.”). 
9 A common law marriage is a marriage between two people who did not obtain a marriage license nor solemnize 
their union by formal ceremony.  Although state laws vary, it generally requires the mutual consent of the parties to 
the marriage, cohabitation, and a public declaration that the parties are husband and wife. Hurley v. Hurley, 721 
P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 1986).  Common law marriage is permitted in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. Wall v.
Williams, 11 Ala. 826 (Ala. 1847); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109.5 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 
(West 2003); Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 77 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1956); Smith v. Smith, 165 P.2d 593 (Kan.
1946); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:39 (2004); Fisher v. Fisher, 243 P. 730, 731
(Okla. 1925); Holgate v. United Electric Rys. Co. 133 A. 243, 243 (R.I. 1926); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360 
(YEAR); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2004); Hoage v. Murch
Bros. Const. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
10 Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § 283 (1971).
11 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 202 (YEAR) (“A marriage ceremony may be performed by (1) priest, minister,
rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the
authorities of his religion to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or
justice of the peace.”).
12 State law varies on the number of witnesses required to perfect a ceremonial marriage. For example, Arizona
requires two witnesses, while Connecticut does not require any witnesses so long as the officiant is qualified or the
parties reasonably believe him to be. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-125 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-24 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
13 But see Comments, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436, 436 (1941) (describing elaborate ceremonial procedures for transferring
title to real property in medieval times; such form requirements no longer exist today).
14 FLOYD RUSSELL MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 80, 48 (1914).
15 Id. §§ 124, 126, 86–87.
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party authorizes an agent to stand in his stead at the marriage ceremony, are widely disdained in 
the United States.16 
 Agency theory, we say, is simply not well-suited to application in the marital context,17 
and thus a proxy marriage is not a valid marriage at all in most states.18  Only five American 
states have recognized otherwise, and nearly all in an exceptionally narrow context involving 
military personnel.19  So serious is the contempt for proxy marriage that the doctrine has been 
rejected throughout most of this country for almost seventy years.20  But things have changed 
and it is now time to reevaluate the efficacy and equity of continuing a distinction between 
marriage and all other contractual relationships to which agency theory applies.   
Society has evolved in a much more mobile direction.21  Its members more often find 
themselves separated by great distances, by different means and for different reasons than they 
did in the past.22  Thousands of couples desiring to marry are unable to fulfill ceremonial 
marriage requirements because active military service makes travel impossible.23  Far more often 
these days, other employment commitments require one party to live away from home for an 
extended period and make personal participation in a marriage ceremony impossible or 
                                                 
16 Emily Post, Etiquette, in THE BLUE BOOK OF SOCIAL USAGE, Ch. 26. “The Day of the Wedding” (Funk & 
Wagnalls Co., New York, 1937). See also Marvin M. Moore, The Case for Proxy Marriage, 11 CLEV.–MARSHALL 
L. REV. 313, 313 (1962).  
17 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 124, at 84–85. 
18 See supra note 15. See also 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 15 (“Under the law of some states, parties cannot be 
married by proxy. In such states the personal presence of both the bride and the groom at the marriage rites is 
essential to the proper solemnization of the marriage, and a marriage by proxy is invalid as a ceremonial marriage.”).  
19 CAL. FAM. CODE § 420 (West. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109 (2005); 89 Op. Att’y Gen. 261 (1980), 
1980 WL 117668 (Kan. A.G.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 (Vernon 2006). 
20 NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 154 (Harvard University Press, 
2000).   
21 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 413 (1990); 
D. ELAZAR, BUILDING CITIES IN AMERICA: URBANIZATION AND SUBURBANIZATION IN A FRONTIER SOCIETY 16 
(1987) (describing the “nomadism” of the American people as one of the hallmarks of American life).  
22 See Bradway, supra, at 112–14; see generally Briffault, supra note 21. 
23 Moore, supra note 16, at 313; Bradway, supra, at 114.  
4impracticable.24  In what was perhaps the highest profile proxy marriage attempted in the United 
States, for example, a Russian cosmonaut working while orbiting Earth aboard the International 
Space Station in 2003 married his Texan bride by proxy through the use of an agent standing in 
for the groom at NASA.25  Same sex partners around the country, who may now legally marry in 
six American jurisdictions,26 might avoid the cost and other significant burdens of traveling to a 
state permitting same sex marriage by appointing proxies and remaining in their home state.27  In 
each of these situations, denying parties who strongly desire to take on the contractual 
obligations of the marital relationship deprives them—and, worse still, their children—of the 
many personal and property rights afforded to married persons.28 
Perhaps more importantly, the law has evolved as well.  Agency theories, once relegated 
almost exclusively to commercial transactions,29 now have application to scores of personal 
24 See Briffault, supra note 21, at 413. See, e.g., Government Jobs Overview, Federal Jobs Net, 
http://federaljobs.net.overview.htm (“Many federal workers’ duties require travel away from their duty station to 
attend meetings, complete training, or perform inspections while others—such as auditors, instructors, field 
engineering crews, and safety investigators—may require extensive travel for weeks or months at a time. Some 
employees are on continuous travel. . . .”).  
25 James Oberg, Cosmonaut in world’s first space wedding, MSNBC.com, Aug. 12, 2003, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3077947/.  
Internationally, many of history’s most famous couples were married by proxy.  Napoleon married Maria 
Louisa by proxy in 1810 with an Archduke performing his role.  JOHN S.C. ABBOTT, THE HISTORY OF NAPOLEON
BONAPARTE 122 (Harper & Bros. Pubs. 1904).  Marie Antoinette and King Louis XVI were also married by proxy. 
JEANNE-LOUISE HENRIETTA, MEMOIRS OF MARIE ANTOINETTE, QUEEN OF FRANCE & WIFE OF LOUIS XVI 38-39 (PF 
Collier & Sons Pubs. 1910). 
26 New Hampshire, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Vermont, and the District of Columbia allow marriages 
between same sex partners.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (2004 & Supp. 2008); Elizabeth Kerrigan et al. v. 
Commissioner of Public Health et al, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Katherine Varnum et al. v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Vt. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 
1201–07 (2007); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3) (2009).  In addition, the tribal law of the Coquille Indian Tribe in Oregon 
permits same sex marriage. COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 740.010(2) (2008).  
27 See Kevin Lavery, Online Gay Marriage Seen as Game-Changer, npr.org, Dec. 14, 2009, available at  
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121283017 (describing the serious economic boon that might 
be fostered if states allowing gay marriage allowed parties to seek marriage licenses online).  See also Adam 
Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, E-Marriage:  Breaking the Marriage Monopoly, draft available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491704. 
28 See infra Part III.A.2. 
29 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 10, at 5 (“If agency be deemed to belong to contractual representation properly, it will 
at once be seen that it belongs to a condition of society in which commercial transactions are highly developed. A 
non-commercial society, while it might have much use for servants, would have little need of agents. The historical 
condition seems to accord with this conclusion.”). 
5dealings.  Among other things, one can, only as a result of legal developments in the last thirty 
years, appoint an agent to make end-of-life decisions,30 appoint an agent to draft a will,31 even 
appoint an agent to exercise custody over one’s child.32  In other words, agency doctrine has 
permeated the most personal of our relationships, save the marital relationship. 
The time has come to reassess our long-standing intolerance of proxy marriage.  To that 
end, Part I of this article surveys the history of proxy marriage from early Roman times to today, 
with a view toward providing an explanation for the doctrine’s negative perception, both in the 
United States and abroad.  Part II describes the reluctance to sanction proxy marriage based on 
the theory that agency law is not properly extended to exceptionally personal transactions and 
challenges the assumption that marriage is too personal to be governed by agency principles 
given their application to other intimate dealings.  Part III details why proxy marriage is needed 
in today’s mobile society from an equitable standpoint and describes how existing protective 
mechanisms inherent in agency law can ensure the continued integrity of proxy marriages. 
Finally, this article argues that it is time to stop singling out the marital contract as unworthy of 
the regime of agency.  A widespread revival of proxy marriage is long overdue. 
I. THE VALIDITY OF PROXY MARRIAGE:  THEN AND NOW
The history of proxy marriage is as long as it is sordid, with some arguing that its first 
recognition dates back to biblical times.33  It was a well-accepted means of perfecting a marriage 
in both of the world’s great legal traditions—civil law and common law—in antiquity, remained 
30 See infra Part II.  Pennsylvania was the first state to enact a special durable power of attorney for health care 
decisions in 1983. Cynthia M. Garraty, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care: A Better Choice, 7 CONN.
PROB. L.J. 115, 119 (1992) (citing to 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601–07 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). By 1992, 
thirty-two states had done so.  Id. at 120. 
31 See infra Part II.A. 
32 See infra Part II.B.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:951 to 954 (2008).  
33 See, e.g., Luke B. Henry, California & Proxy Marriage, 27 J. ST. B. OF CAL. 294 (2952) (“The first recorded 
instance of a marriage contracted by proxy is said to have been when Rebecca offered water from the well to the 
servant of Abraham who had been empowered to find a wife for Abraham’s son, Isaac.”). 
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possible through the middle ages, and likely even took hold in the American colonies.  In fact, 
proxy marriage was practiced somewhat prolifically in the United States until just after World 
War I, when racial and immigration concerns led to its virtual demise.  Today, the possibility of a 
valid proxy marriage in America is rather scant.  Much of the rest of the world holds quite a 
different view, however, making the legality of proxy marriage a controversial issue over which 
nations regularly engage in vigorous debate.34 
A. The Genesis and Development of the Proxy Marriage Doctrine  
The validity of a proxy marriage was recognized at some point across almost all societies.  
Even those groups who seem most likely to abhor the doctrine—in particular, organized religious 
groups such as the Roman Catholic Church—embraced proxy marriage as necessary and 
equitable.  As a result, proxy marriage rather easily gained acceptance in the United States, 
though after its introduction here the doctrine quickly became loathed and ultimately was 
abrogated. 
1. Roman Acceptance of Marriage by Messenger 
For the ancient Romans, marriage was viewed as a contract, a relationship “based solely 
upon the agreement of the parties to take each other from that moment as husband and wife.”35  
Thus, the only requirement of entering into a valid marriage was consent, mutually expressed.36  
No particular ceremony or officiant was required in Roman times, and the consent of the spouses 
                                                 
34 See Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 365–69 (1963).  
35 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARV. L. REV. 473, 474 (1919). 
36 F. SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 111 (1951). This has been true, at least, since the time of Alexander the 
Great. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Case of the Man Who Fell into the Tiber: The Roman Law of Marriage at the 
Time of the Glossators, 22 ANN. J. LEGAL HIS. 1, 12 (1978). In more ancient times, the consent of the bride was 
altogether unnecessary, though Roman law evolved to require the consent of both the bride and groom. A. A. 
Roberts, Marriage by Proxy: Including a Brief Consideration of the Nature of Marriage and of Agency, 60 S. 
AFRICAN L.J. 280, 284 (1943).  Additionally, a paterfamilias’ consent to the marriage of a child under his power was 
required.  Susan Treggiari, Ideals and Practicalities in Matchmaking in Ancient Rome in THE FAMILY IN ITALY FROM 
ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT 94 (David I. Kertzer & Richard P. Saller, eds. Yale Univ. Press, 1991).  
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was not required to take on any particular form.37  As in all contracts, expressions of consent 
could be made in writing, orally, and perhaps even tacitly.38   
This perception of marriage as mere civil contract was taken quite seriously, so much so 
that Roman authorities viewed the expression of consent, at least for a man, as possible not only 
in person, but also through a letter or the use of an agent, which were acceptable means of 
consenting to ordinary contractual relationships.39  Thus, the Roman law permitted a man away 
from home to perfect a marriage in his absence through the use of a messenger.40  The intended 
husband’s use of a proxy in this manner created a perfectly valid marriage.41  The same 
possibility of marrying by proxy did not extend to an absent woman, however, largely because of 
Roman views with regard to the appropriate course of conduct between parties immediately after 
the  marriage ceremony.42  The notion was that wife needed to be led into the domicile of the 
marriage such that the parties could officially begin their married life, and the marital domicile 
was necessarily that of the husband in early Roman times.43  It was therefore not possible for 
wife to use a proxy to perfect the marital contract because she could not then be led to the marital 
domicile.  The Roman husband, however, was free to marry by proxy at will.44  By roughly 550, 
the requirement that the wife be led to the home of the husband was no longer a clear legal 
mandate, though it persisted for some period as a custom.45  Thus, by the middle of the sixth 
                                                 
37 Id. at 95–96. 
38 Id. 
39 Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 474. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Roberts, supra note 36, at 284. 
43 Id. at 284. 
44 DIGEST 23.2.5; Roberts, supra note 36, at 284.  
45 DIGEST 23.2.5; Roberts, supra note 36, at 284.  
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century, proxy marriage had fully taken hold as a legally permissible manner of creating the 
marital relationship.46   
This rather complete acceptance of the doctrine of proxy marriage by Roman citizens and 
jurists would prove significant.  The spread of Roman law throughout nearly all of Europe47 and 
its role in shaping the civil law of a number of European countries more than six centuries later48 
ensured proxy marriage a continuing presence in the international legal landscape.49 
2. Canon Law’s Surprising Approval 
Perhaps even more significant to the long-term survival of the proxy marriage doctrine 
than its Roman law reception is the warm welcome it received in the Roman Catholic canon law.  
One might assume that marriage was always inextricably linked with religion, but the link did 
not actually appear in law until approximately 541.  The Corpus Juris Civilis, the Emperor 
Justinian’s influential compilation of early Roman law,50 required that all but citizens holding 
high office “betake themselves to some place of worship and declare their intention” to a church 
official before several witnesses such that the church could document the marriage.51  Canon law 
certainly recognized marriage as a legal relationship, a contract.  But in requiring that the parties 
celebrate the perfection of their contract in the church and with the blessing of a priest, the canon 
law sought primarily to provide the marriage publicity, i.e. to “bring the fact of marriage to the 
notice of the church.”52  Ensuring that the marriage was entirely voluntary—that the parties did 
truly consent to the creation of the contract—might best be described as an afterthought, a 
                                                 
46 Roberts, supra note 36, at 284. 
47 See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 40–41 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).  
48 See id. at 43–49. 
49 See infra, Part I.B.2. 
50 Eric Gillman, Note, Legal Transplants & Investment Agreements:  Understanding the Exportation of U.S. Law to 
Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 263 (2009). 
51 Roberts, supra note 36, at 285–86. 
52 Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 476.  
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positive side effect of the requirement that marriages take place in a church.53  On the 
background of this aim to bring couples into the church to celebrate their marriage contracts, 
canon law was required to take a legal stance on proxy marriage, in essence, to determine 
whether one spouse’s failure to personally declare consent before witnesses and a priest was 
sufficient to taint the entire marriage with nullity.  Rather surprisingly, the canon law view was 
that it was not. 
Centuries later, in 1215, proxy marriage aroused great attention at canon law when the 
Roman Catholic Church, under Pope Innocent III’s leadership, fully sanctioned the Roman view 
of the  validity of a marriage perfected with one party using a stand-in.54  In a development 
somewhat progressive for the time, however, canon law modified the Roman rule to make it 
possible for either husband or wife to marry by proxy.  Thus, the possibility of proxy marriage 
became rather well-accepted, and gender-neutral, in the canon law of the early thirteenth 
century.55   
More than one hundred years later, under Pope Boniface VIII, the church’s approval of 
proxy marriage persisted, though not without some dissatisfaction.  A number of church officials 
voiced opposition to the continuing acceptance of proxy marriage, suggesting that the marital 
contract is one “of such far reaching consequences that [consent] should be expressed in person 
instead of by proxy.”56  Even in the face of this opposition, however, the church continued to 
treat proxy marriages as valid.  The majority view was that there is an in-person expression of 
consent by a principal to a proxy marriage.  Agency theory views the agent as the principal, such 
                                                 
53 By the time of the Council of Trent in 1563, issues relating to the voluntariness of consent to the marital 
relationship had gained more sway. CARRIERE, DE MATRIMONIO § 4; EMIL FRIEDBERG, LEHRBUCH DES 
KIRCHENRECHTS 490 (1895). See also Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 476 (“Since the Council of Trent (1563) 
matrimonial consents must be exchanged according to the Canon Law before a priest and at least two witnesses.”).  
54 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 369 (1895). See also 
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 475. 
55 Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 474. 
56 Id. at 475. 
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that when an agent expresses his assent to a contract, the principal, has essentially “pronounce[d] 
the words” himself “through the [agent’s] mouth.”57 
By the time of the Roman Catholic Church’s most important ecumenical council—the 
Council of Trent in 1563—the church’s internal debate over the permissibility of proxy marriage 
had reached a fever pitch again, with disagreement centering upon whether the appointment of a 
proxy was to be done in the same form as the expression of consent in the marriage ceremony 
itself, namely before a priest and at least two witnesses.58  Focusing on the core intent of canon 
law’s ceremonial requirement, again, to publicize the marriage to the church, the prevailing view 
was that ceremonial requirements need not extend to the contract created between an intended 
spouse and the proxy he appointed to act on his behalf, as the form of this agency contract did 
not bear in any way on the church’s knowledge of the marriage.59  Thus, at the termination of 
Council of Trent late in the sixteenth century, proxy marriage was still very much a part of canon 
law. 
3. English Common Law Reception 
The early English common law of marriage, much like Roman law, focused virtually all 
of its marriage requirements on ensuring the voluntary consent of both spouses.  And thus, a 
solemn ceremony at which the husband pledged to love, comfort, honor, keep his wife in 
sickness and health, and remain faithful to her, and the wife to do these and also to obey and 
serve her husband, was a critical part of any English marriage ceremony.60  Such declarations 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 476. 
59 Id. at 476. 
60 WILLIAM TEGG, THE KNOT TIED: MARRIAGE CEREMONIES OF ALL NATIONS 19–20 (1877). 
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were intended to assure that the contracting parties “seriously weigh and consider” married life 
and express consent only after fully analyzing the rights and duties the relationship will bring.61   
The English ceremonial requirements necessarily raised the question of whether 
marriages contracted with the parties outside each others’ physical presence, such that they 
would be unable to make the necessary declarations in person, could have validity.  On this 
question, the English answer was clear.  The Church of England wholly adopted the canon law 
view of proxy marriage.62  Marriages between absent persons could be validly contracted by 
letter, by messenger, or through the use of agents.63  The only exception at English law, which 
was apparently not a requirement of either the Roman or canon law systems, was that parties to a 
proxy marriage “have some notice or intelligence” of the other party to the marital relationship, 
“for unto those who be utterly unknown to us, we cannot yield or consent no more than it is 
possible for us to love them, of whom we have never heard.”64 
With that one narrow exception, proxy marriage was as well accepted in England through 
the eighteenth century as it was in the rest of the world.65  Indeed, proxy marriage has a place 
among some of the most famous in English history.  Queen Mary of England married Phillip II 
of Spain in a proxy ceremony in 1554, with a Count Egmont standing in for the groom.66  King 
James I of England married Anne of Denmark in August of 1589 by proxy.67  After the proxy 
ceremony, Anne set sail to Scotland but was forced by storm to the coast of Norway; in what has 
been described as the “one romantic episode of his life,” the King sailed with three-hundred men 
                                                 
61 Id. at 20. 
62 Id. at 21–22. See also Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 480–81. 
63 Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 481. 
64 Id. at 481. 
65 See id. at 481.  The first recorded evidence of proxy marriage in England is in Lyndwood’s Provinciale, written in 
1430.  WILLIAM LYNDWOOD, PROVINCIALE (1430). See also Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 480. 
66 WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT, HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILLIP THE SECOND, KING OF SPAIN, Vol. 1, 90–91 
(1902); TEGG, supra note 60, at 51. 
67 Hugh Chisholm, Anne of Denmark, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 69–70 (11th ed. 1910). 
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to meet his new bride.68  And proxy marriage in old England was neither restricted to nor 
practiced solely among nobility.  Ordinary citizens separated by substantial distances were 
known to perfect marital relationships from afar as well.69 
4. Proxy Marriage’s Post-Colonization Survival? 
When the British migrated to America in the seventeenth century, they were said to carry 
their law, which still legitimized proxy marriage, with them.70  The new American colonies 
essentially adopted English law after their colonization.71  It is virtually universally accepted, 
however, that the new colonies adopted English law only to the extent it was suited to their 
unique colonial conditions.72   
While there is no hard and fast evidence that colonial American law sanctioned proxy 
marriage, the colonial embracement of British law strongly suggests that proxy marriage was 
permitted in early America.  “That [marital] consent might be expressed by an agent was 
admitted by Roman law, by the canon law, and . . . by the English law as late as the eighteenth 
century.”73  The only remaining question is whether colonists might have rejected the British law 
sanctioning proxy marriage as unsuited to the times.74  That is highly unlikely.  Proxy marriage 
was likely even more closely tailored to fit American colonial society than it was their British 
counterpart.  “Many a colonist must have left a sweetheart behind when he first ventured over 
seas.  [Still others] must have desired, after becoming established in this country, to marry 
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someone whom they had known in their native land.”75  In either situation, a trip to the homeland 
merely for the purpose of perfecting a marriage was as time consuming as it was cost 
prohibitive.76  Proxy marriage was precisely the legal device to solve the problem created by the 
distance gap.  It “would enable the woman to become the man’s wife before leaving” her home 
country on a long and arduous journey to the colonies.77 
As a result, though there is very little evidence in colonial law of a wholesale acceptance 
of proxy marriage,78 its suitability for colonial times and the fact that American states in the 
decades following colonization seemed to recognize the possibility of a proxy marriage rather 
clearly, make it a near certainty that proxy marriage did migrate to the new world along with its 
British settlers. 
5. The Twentieth Century: Marriage, War, Prostitutes, and “Picture Brides” 
Intertwined 
 
If proxy marriage was legally sanctioned in colonial America, it went virtually 
unrecognized for decades.  But around the turn of the twentieth century, and for the following 
forty years, the possibility of proxy marriage garnered substantial new interest.  The reason for 
the renewed attention paid to the old—perhaps even dying—doctrine was clear.  Two World 
Wars raised new social problems to which the traditional conception of ceremonial marriage 
provided no just solution.   
Servicemen stationed overseas strongly desired the ability to use proxy marriage to make 
formal unions for which they were unable to express consent in the physical presence of their 
intended wives.  “The first World War, when only four million men were in the armed forces, 
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occasioned a demand whose dimensions impelled the Judge Advocate General of the Army to 
provide a form of contract for marriage by mail.  There are indications that in the second World 
War, when over eleven million persons were in the armed forces, the need for a valid form of 
marriage between absent parties assumed even greater proportions.”79  And because family law 
at the time branded children born outside of wedlock as illegitimates not entitled to the same 
legal rights and protections as children born of a marriage,80 more than these servicemen’s sense 
of pride and emotion was at stake.  “Children fathered by servicemen before embarkation” 
deserved a means of legal protection that ceremonial marriage could not provide.81   
As a result, many members of the armed forces in both world wars engaged in proxy 
marriages, despite the lack of clarity as to whether such marriages carried the force of law in 
early twentieth-century America.82  Some scholars of the time argued that these marriages were 
no doubt legally valid.83  Others argued the need for more clarification as to the validity of a 
marriage ceremony conducted with the use of an agent84 and a few state legislatures responded 
with narrowly tailored bills recognizing the validity of proxy marriages between absent 
servicemen and their partners.85  Still other states decried the practice of proxy marriage 
altogether, begrudging its perceived disastrous impact on American immigration policy.86   
Regardless of the generally prevailing view of the propriety and necessity of proxy 
marriages for military personnel, a growing fear and loathing of the practical effect of a broad 
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approval of proxy marriage for all members of society reached new heights in the 1920s.  
Concern over proxy marriage was largely fueled by immigration policy, racism, and a staunchly 
held American view of love-based marriage not widely accepted in many other cultures at the 
time.87 
The crux of the growing distaste for approval of proxy marriage stemmed from a gate-
keeping problem.  If American soldiers stationed overseas were permitted to marry their brides 
from a distance, then the law effectively recognized absentee marriages conducted by proxy.  
And once the law admitted the possibility of valid absentee marriages, it was confronted with the 
possibility that the absent spouse might not be an American citizen serviceman stationed abroad.  
Rather, an absentee marriage with the assistance of a proxy might be conducted between an 
American citizen, present in person for the marriage ceremony, and his bride located abroad.  
And while the base legal transaction was the same—one American citizen in the United States 
marrying another not present in the United States for the ceremony—perception of the two 
situations differed immensely.  Men who desired to marry foreign brides by proxy were dubbed 
scoundrels, pimps, or worse.88 
The core of the problem was that immigration rules which have persisted in this country 
for nearly a century provide for easy, automatic, and permanent resident status in the United 
States for the spouse of any American citizen.89  When American men began to use proxy 
marriage to choose foreign brides, with those women eventually emigrating to the United States, 
concerns arose along two fronts.  First, the Bureau of Immigration90 became worried that the 
                                                 
87 NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 151 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2000).  
88 See generally id. at 148.  
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doctrine of proxy marriage was being abused as a means of bringing foreign prostitutes into the 
United States.91  That concern was racially tinged.  Immigration officials at the time “suspected 
all Jews at entry points; only Asians drew more fire.”92  Immigration agents believed that ninety 
percent of Japanese and Chinese women immigrating to the United States at the time were 
actually brought in as prostitutes.93  Second, even when it was clear that a proxy marriage did not 
involve the immigration of a prostitute, American officials disdained the continuation of proxy 
marriage and the benefits it conveyed on spouses living abroad because they believed it led to the 
proliferation of “picture brides” entering America.  These picture brides—the early twentieth 
century equivalent of today’s “mail order bride”94—entered the country after a proxy marriage to 
an American husband, typically without even having met him before landing on American soil.95  
Asian immigrants were again the suspect class here, and marriages involving Japanese and 
Korean immigrants were particularly scrutinized.96  Throughout much of the twentieth century, 
those cultures generally accepted the idea of arranged marriage, 97 whereby “economic 
bargaining” and building “kinship networks” through marriage was important.98  Such motives 
for marriage were antithetical to the American culture of the time, which had already fully 
committed to the idea of purely love-based marriage.99  Regarding picture brides, “the whiff of 
compulsion of the couple by extended family members, the possible instrumentalism of the 
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97 Id.  
98 Id. at 150. 
99 Id. 
 17
marriage choice, and the importance of monetary consideration all ran against the American 
grain.  An arranged marriage represented coercion.”100  Thus, proxy marriage began to be viewed 
negatively as a means of skirting societal norms surrounding marriage. 
Though fear was at its peak, precisely how much abuse of the doctrine of proxy marriage 
and its resulting immigration benefits actually existed is still unclear.  Newspaper headlines of 
the time “screamed out… ‘Japanese Picture Brides Are Swarming Here’.”101  But when 
“pressured by the Japan Association of America, the Bureau of Immigration conceded that only 
865 proxy brides landed in San Francisco during the year from June 1914 to June 1915.  The 
California population at the time numbered nearly 3 million.”102  Still, as a result of concerns 
over prostitution and the motives of those marrying by proxy, American officials in 1924 took 
the substantial step of declaring that “any marriage performed when one of the parties was in the 
United States and the other in a foreign country was invalid for immigration purposes.”103  The 
rule was exceptionally broad, as it seemed to disapprove of all proxy marriages no matter where 
perfected, at least so long as they were relied upon to confer immigration status.  By 1924, then, 
the view of proxy marriage began to morph and sentiment disfavoring the doctrine became 
overwhelming, even if confined to the immigration context. 
To be sure, American servicemen stationed abroad continued to use proxy marriage to 
perfect unions with their American brides even after 1924 and continuing through both World 
Wars.104  Such unions posed no immigration complications.  But in view of the previously-
existing uncertainty over the legality of these marriages, the move toward a rejection of proxy 
marriage as a viable means of perfecting a legal union, if only in the immigration context, 
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signaled an important shift in American thinking.  By the late 1920s, proxy marriage was 
viewed, at best, as a necessity in only the most exceptional circumstances, and even then, 
through skeptical lenses.  And though proxy marriage peaked again briefly during World War II, 
it became “dormant” shortly afterwards.105 
B. A Dying Institution?:  The Status of Proxy Marriage Today 
Today, proxy marriage enjoys mixed levels of acceptance around the globe.  In the 
United States, rather widespread tolerance of the doctrine faded quickly after the second World 
War.106  In peace time during a period in which American society was less mobile,107 the 
doctrine of proxy marriage fell into desuetude.  It has not yet been completely extinguished from 
the legal landscape in this country, but its recognition is a rarity at best.   
Internationally, the reception of proxy marriage as a valid means of creating the spousal 
relationship has enjoyed far more longevity.  This greater continuing European acceptance of 
proxy marriage became evident in the early 1960s, when the United Nations Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages declined to 
require the presence of both parties at a marriage ceremony in order to create a marriage which 
brings about “‘the natural and fundamental group-unit of society’: the family.”108  The United 
Nations’ refusal to prohibit proxy marriage was one of the most controversial family law issues 
of the Convention, with a number of jurisdictions strongly advocating on each side of the 
issue.109   
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Indeed, the United Nations’ debate over proxy marriage “made it clearer than the 
consideration of any other issue to what extent . . . the world was still divided on the concept of 
marriage.”110  Even forty years after those initial United Nations discussions, divisions persist.  
The American view of the impermissibility of proxy marriage is simply not one shared globally. 
1. Limited American Law Recognition 
These days the possibility of perfecting a valid proxy marriage in the United States has 
grown remote.  Only a handful of states approve the practice111 and most do so on a very limited 
basis.  And even in states which rather liberally sanction the creation of a marital relationship by 
proxy, little reported litigation exists to flesh out the details of the law. 
All but one of the five states allowing proxy marriage does so expressly by statute.  
Kansas statutes provides perhaps the least clarity on the issue.  In its legislation detailing the 
solemnization requirements of a Kansas marriage, proxy marriage is not mentioned at all.112  
Kansas simply requires a marriage license and a particular type of officiant.113  The statute 
neither sanctions nor prohibits marriages conducted by proxy.  Nonetheless, in response to 
requests for guidance from state district judges, the Kansas Attorney General has issued a 
number of opinions on the validity of proxy marriages in the state, and every Attorney General 
opinion on this issue since the first in 1944 is consistent.114  In the absence of an express 
legislative prohibition, proxy marriages are legal in Kansas.115  The requirement is simply that 
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the person who will not attend the marriage ceremony give a valid power of attorney to the 
proxy.116 
Texas statutes provide slightly more guidance.  Persons “unable to appear for [a 
marriage] ceremony” are authorized to appoint a proxy by affidavit.117  The statute is broad, 
insofar as it does not restrict the class of persons authorized to make use of a proxy marriage.  
Setting ceremonial requirements aside, Texas even allows parties to act by proxy in seeking a 
marriage license,118 but only if the party seeking the license by proxy is “on active duty as a 
member of the” state or federal armed forces or “confined in a correctional facility.”  The Texas 
Attorney General has opined, in response to a district attorney’s question, that the possibility of 
use of a proxy to obtain a marriage license in Texas may even permit double proxies.119  
Specifically, the Attorney General expressed that two inmates would be permitted to obtain a 
marriage license while incarcerated, each using his own proxy.120   
No Texas authority extends the double proxy rule to participation in the marriage 
ceremony.  Nonetheless, Texas law rather liberally permits proxy marriage in allowing “any 
person” to utilize a proxy for the ceremony rather than limiting its use to members of the armed 
forces or the incarcerated.121  The statute requires only that the person using the proxy execute an 
affidavit with detailed information about the applicant and an “appointment of any adult… to act 
as proxy for the purpose of participating in the ceremony.122  No reported Texas appellate 
opinion applies the Texas statute or discusses the Attorney General opinion, and thus the 
pragmatic state of Texas law on proxy marriage remains unclear. 
                                                 
116 Id.  
117 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.203(b) (Vernon 2006). 
118 TEX. FAM. CODE  ANN. § 2.006(c) (Vernon 2006).  
119 Op. Att’y Gen. GA-0024, 2003 WL 396062 (Tex. A.G.). A marriage by “double proxy” occurs when both 
spouses to the marriage are not at the marriage ceremony over which the officiant presides.  See id. 
120 Id.  
121 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.203(b) (Vernon 2006). 
122 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.007 (Vernon 2006). 
 21
The rules in Colorado and Montana are nearly identical.  Both states’ statutes provide:  
If a party to a marriage is unable to be present at the solemnization, such party 
may authorize in writing a third party to act as such party’s proxy.  If the person 
solemnizing the marriage is satisfied that the absent party is unable to be present 
and has consented to the marriage, such person may solemnize the marriage by 
proxy.  If such person is not satisfied, the parties may petition the district court for 
an order permitting the marriage to be solemnized by proxy.123   
Thus, both states appear to provide any party a right to marry by proxy, for any reason, so long 
as he has properly appointed an agent.   
In April 2007, however, Montana began departing from Colorado law through the 
addition of a more stringent limitation on the persons who may qualify to marry by proxy.  
Specifically, Montana began limiting the use of proxy marriage to military personnel.124  Even 
with this limitation, however, Montana is notorious for having the most liberal proxy marriage 
scheme in the country because it is the only state allowing double proxies for the marriage 
ceremony.125 
Finally, California expressly allows for the perfection of a valid proxy marriage in a 2004 
statute126 that is both more detailed and more stringent than those found in other states.127  
California legislation allows a marriage by agent only for a member of the armed forces of the 
United States who is stationed overseas serving in a conflict or a war and is unable to appear for 
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the marriage ceremony.128  Moreover, it requires that the party stationed overseas execute a 
power of attorney in writing and signed by a notary or witnessed by two officers of the United 
States armed forces.129  The California proxy does not allow the absent spouse’s agent to merely 
present himself for the first time as a representative at the ceremony.  Rather, the person 
appointed must personally appear with the non-absent spouse in order to procure the marriage 
license.130  The power of attorney is then presented to the clerk when the marriage license is 
obtained and it becomes part of the marriage certificate thereafter.131   
Although no reported appellate decision exists applying the portion of California’s statute 
sanctioning proxy marriage when one party is a member of the armed forces, a recent California 
case suggests the possibility that state law may sanction proxy marriage even for non-military 
personnel.  In People v. Tami, a criminal case in which defendant Tami was prosecuted for 
“filing a false or forged marriage license in a public office,”132  the defendant’s conviction was 
reversed on appeal on grounds of insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she knowingly filed a 
false or forged document.  Interestingly, the reversal of Tami’s conviction rests almost entirely 
on the lack of clarity in California law with respect to marriage ceremonies completed outside of 
the physical presence of both spouses and an officiant together in the same room.133 
Tami does not involve the traditional factual setting giving rise to proxy marriage—two 
parties separated by a great distance, likely for employment reasons, with one authorizing a close 
friend of relative to “stand in” as a result of the temporary absence.  Quite to the contrary, Tami 
sought to marry a man living in the same county in which she resided.  Nonetheless, it was not 
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possible for Tami and her intended to participate in a ceremony before a qualified officiant 
together in the same room because Tami’s fiancé was incarcerated in the San Quentin State 
Prison.134 
Tami sought a marriage license from the Napa County Recorder’s Office and told the 
clerk that her fiancé was “not available” to appear.135  The clerk then gave her an affidavit of 
inability to appear and told her that she and her fiancé would need to sign the appropriate forms 
and then she would need their officiant to accompany her to obtain the license.  Tami signed her 
fiancé’s name, with his authorization, by tracing his signature from other documents.136  Tami 
and her officiant, a Universal Life church minister, then went to a house where Tami, the 
officiant, and several witnesses conducted a phone ceremony.  The intended groom participated 
by telephone from prison.137  Defendant Tami then submitted a marriage certificate, bearing the 
signatures of all of the necessary parties, for filing with the county recorder.138  When California 
prosecuted Tami for knowingly offering a false or fraudulent document to be filed in the public 
records, Tami responded that “a ‘proxy marriage’ performed with one party ‘represented by an 
agent’ or present by telephone rather than ‘physically present at the ceremony’ is valid in 
California.”139 
In reversing Tami’s conviction, the California appellate court made no effort to 
distinguish this case from a traditional proxy marriage case, or to determine whether this was 
even a case involving proxy marriage at all.  In one sense, facts involving telephone participation 
in a marriage ceremony may be viewed as something very different from a traditional marriage 
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by proxy.  In a telephone marriage, the parties don’t truly intend that one be represented by an 
agent.  Rather, his phone presence is his participation; no other person need “stand in” for him.  
On the other hand, both a traditional proxy scenario and a telephone ceremony raise the same 
core question—can the California statutory requirement that parties declare their consent “in the 
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and necessary witnesses” be met in any manner 
other than a personal physical presence of all necessary persons in the same room at the same 
time?140  Because that core issue is the same whether the marriage at issue is one of a serviceman 
represented by an agent or a prisoner participating by telephone, the court focused its discussion 
on the validity of proxy marriage in California.   
Unfortunately, the Tami court declined to decide whether proxy marriages are legal in 
California.  Rather, because the crime of which Tami was convicted required a “knowing” 
violation of the law, the court focused on what Tami knew, or should have known, about the 
validity of a California proxy marriage. 
The Tami court cited three prior decisions bearing on the validity of proxy marriage in 
California.  One, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, actually 
applied Nevada law to a California resident.141  But in so doing, the court first found that Nevada 
law sanctioning proxy marriage does not violate any strong public policy in California.142  The 
Ninth Circuit went on to say that proxy marriages are really no different from more traditional 
marriages, do not necessarily present any serious questions of consent, and are occasionally 
necessary for equitable reasons.143  Citing this Ninth Circuit case, a California appellate court 
seemed to approve of California proxy marriages in a legal malpractice case twelve years 
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later.144  Finally, another California appellate court assumed the validity of a Jordanian proxy 
marriage in deciding whether to enforce a dowry contract.145  Viewing these three cases together, 
the Tami court described California law on the validity of proxy marriage as “unsettled.”146  The 
court further held that defendant Tami’s conviction could not be upheld because of insufficient 
proof that she knew her telephone marriage was invalid, particularly in light of the “public policy 
objective to promote and protect the marriage relationship.”147 
The Tami court’s reliance on at least two of three precedents to suggest that proxy 
marriage is generally acceptable in California is noticeably flawed.  That California would 
recognize the legality of a proxy marriage perfected in Nevada or Jordan does not mean that such 
a marriage is legally sanctioned by California law.  It is common under principles of full faith 
and credit and comity for one state to give effect to a marriage validly perfected in another 
jurisdiction.148  Nonetheless, the court’s reluctance to state that proxy marriage is not generally 
permitted in California and its description of the law as “unsettled” certainly suggests that 
California courts may be more receptive to arguments urging the validity of a proxy marriage 
outside the military context than the plain language of California statutes implies.149 
The cases demonstrate that California law with regard to proxy marriage is clear on at 
least one front—marriage by proxy is expressly and clearly sanctioned by statute for certain 
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members of the armed services.  For ordinary citizens, Tami signals that state law on proxy 
marriage may be in flux.   
Even beyond these five states which expressly allow it, however, proxy marriage has 
significant legal effects.  In states which require that both spouses have a personal physical 
presence at the marriage ceremony and do not allow spouses to use agents to perfect a 
ceremonial marriage,150 proxy marriages are almost always recognized and given legal effect if 
they are perfected in a state which permits them.151  As a result, the impacts of the legality of 
proxy marriage are felt throughout the United States. 
2. More Fulsome Recognition Abroad 
Outside of the United States, proxy marriage is far better recognized, particularly in 
Central and South American countries. Brazil,152 Argentina,153 Paraguay,154 Colombia,155 
Bolivia,156 Peru,157 Uruguay,158 Venezuela,159 Ecuador,160 Panama,161 El Salvador,162 Costa 
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authority to officiate at marriage ceremonies at the place where he is. The documentation verifying the absentee’s 
consent can only be offered within ninety days of the date when it was granted.”).  
154 Id. (the Argentinean Civil Code is in force in Paraguay). 
155 C.C. art. 114 (2007), in CODIGO CIVIL 67 (ed. Heli Abel Torrado, Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 2004). 
156 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 55. 
157 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 264. 
158 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 100. 
159 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 67. 
160 CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 101. 
161 FAM. C. art. 47 (2008), in FAMILY CODE OF PANAMA 294–95 (trans. by Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence Publishing 
Co., 2009) (“Marriage can be contracted by the appearance before the official and two witnesses, without legal 
impediment, by one of the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of attorney, 
by notarial act; provided that the person that is domiciled or is a resident at the place of officiating of the official that 
is to celebrate the marriage is always necessary. The power of attorney must express the name of the person with 
whom the marriage is to be performed, and basic informational facts for identifying the person, and the marriage 
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Rica,163 Mexico,164 and Cuba165 all permit a party to fulfill the requirements of a ceremonial 
marriage through the use of an agent.166  It is perhaps not so surprising that these countries share 
in the acceptance of proxy marriage, as they are all civilian jurisdictions with legal systems 
derived directly from Roman law,167 which always permitted marriages by proxy.168  These 
countries simply carried forward the Roman law allowing the use of agents in perfecting a 
marital contract.169   
Much of Europe still permits marriages perfected by proxy as well, and likely for the 
same historical reasons.  The doctrine still exists in France,170 Spain,171 Italy,172 and Poland.173   
                                                                                                                                                             
shall be valid unless the revocation of the power of attorney has been given to the empowered agent, in due form, 
prior to the celebration of the marriage.”).  
162 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 30. 
163 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 30. 
164 C.C.F. art. 102 (2002), in (FEDERAL CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO 17 (trans. Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence Publishing 
Co., 2003) (“The parties or their specially empowered agents, constituted in the manner provided in Article 44, as 
well as two witnesses to each of the parties that verify their identity, must be present before the Civil Registry judge 
at the place, day and hour designated for the celebration of the marriage. . . .”); C.C.F. art. 44 (2002), in FEDERAL 
CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO 7 (trans. Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence Publishing Co., 2003) (“When the interested parties 
cannot personally appear, they can be represented by a mandatary specially empowered for the act, whose 
appointment must be made at least by private writing made before two witnesses. In cases involving marriage . . . a 
power of attorney given by notarial act or mandate given by private writing signed by the principal and two 
witnesses, the signatures being ratified before a notary public, a family court judge, a juvenile court judge, or a 
justice of the peace is required.”). 
165 CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 10. 
166 See, e.g., FAM. C. art. 47 (2008), in FAMILY CODE OF PANAMA 294–95 (trans. by Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence 
Publishing Co., 2009) (“Marriage can be contracted by the appearance before the official and two witnesses, without 
legal impediment, by one of the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of 
attorney, by notarial act; . . .”).    
167 Hans Kirchberger, The Significance of Roman Law for the Americas and Its Importance to Inter-American 
Relations, 1944 WIS. L. REV. 249, 255 (1944).  
168 See supra Part I.A.1. 
169 See supra Part I.A.1. 
170 C. CIV. 96-1 (2008) (only for “servicemen, sailors of the State, or persons employed to follow the armies or on 
board State vessels”). 
171 C.C. art. 87 (2006), in CLIFFORD STEVENS WILSON, THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH-AMERICA: INCLUDING 
CUBA, PUERTO RICO AND PHILIPPINE ISLAND 141 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2003) (“Marriages shall be 
celebrated personally or by a proxy to whom a special power has been granted; but the presence of the contracting 
party who is domiciled or resides in the district of the Judge who is to authorize the marriage shall always be 
necessary. The name of the person with whom the marriage is to be celebrated shall be expressed in the special 
power, and such power shall be valid if, before its celebration, the person so authorized should not have been 
notified in an authentic form of the revocation of power.”).  
172 Only members of the armed forces may marry by proxy under Italian law or those in extraordinary 
circumstances. C.C. art. 111 (2006) (“The military and persons who by reason of their duties are attached to the 
armed forces can celebrate marriage by proxy in war time. Celebration of marriage by proxy can also take place if 
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Finally, virtually all of the countries governed by Islamic law sanction proxy marriage,174 
and do so very broadly, allowing double proxies175 and often giving the proxy “unlimited 
discretion” to enter into marriage contracts, including the power to choose a mate on behalf of 
the principal.176 
Overall, the global community is far more liberal in permitting the application of agency 
principles to the marital relationship.177  And this widespread acceptance of proxy marriage is 
significant because it bleeds into America.  Even if we refuse to recognize proxy marriages 
celebrated within American borders, because we give effect to such marriages validly perfected 
abroad,178 the general legal attitude toward the use of agents to perfect the marriage contract 
around the globe is important in shaping American policy. 
II. AGENCY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 
Since the start of the recognition of agency theory thousands of years ago, the powers 
which can be delegated to an agent have been exceptionally broad.179  Traditionally, agency was 
permissibly created for any lawful purpose.180  The only question that needed to be asked was 
whether the principal himself had the authority to do what he appointed an agent to do.181  
Indeed, there are generally only two exceptions to the theory that an agent can be appointed to do 
                                                                                                                                                             
one of the future spouses resides abroad and serious reasons exist, to be appraised by the tribunal in whose 
jurisdiction the other future spouse resides. . . .”).  
173 POL. FAM. CODE § 6 (1998).  
174 See C.M. SHAFQAT, THE MUSLIM MARRIAGE, DOWER AND DIVORCE 36 (1955). 
175 See Schwelb, supra note 34, at 368. 
176 Id.  
177 See id. at 365–68. England, however, ended its long-lasting approval of proxy marriages in 1844 with the case of 
Regina v. Millis in which the English House of Lords declared that it has never been the English law that a marriage 
confected without a ceremony was a valid marriage. 10 CLARK AND FINELLY, 534 (1844). See also POLLOCK & 
MAITLAND, supra note 54, at 370; Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 482.  
178 See Cosulich Societe Triestina Di Navigazione v. Elting, 56 F.2d 534 (N.Y. 1933); Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F.2d 
801 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1929); Kane v. Johnson, 13 F.2d 432 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1926); United States ex re. Modianos v. 
Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927 (E.D. La. 1925); Ex part Suzanna, 295 F. 713 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1924); United States ex rel. Aznar 
v. Commissioner of Immigration, 298 F. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).  
179 Mark Fowler, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1015 (1984). 
180 MECHEM, supra note 14, §80, 48 (1914). 
181 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.04 cmt. b (2006). 
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anything that the principal himself can do.182  First, agency authority may not be created for the 
performance of an act that is unlawful or otherwise violates public policy.183  Second, the 
“nondelegable acts doctrine” prohibits agency delegation of acts exceptionally “personal in 
nature.”184   
Precisely what falls within the domain of the nondelegable acts doctrine has been a tricky 
question for courts and legal scholars.  The theory is clear enough—that acts which rest upon 
some special skill or personal quality of the principal must be performed by him alone and their 
performance may not be delegated to another.185  In practice, however, determining precisely 
where the line between intimate, nondelegable acts and those for which agency principles may 
freely apply should be drawn has been nearly impossible.186  Still, agency scholars have spoken 
rather confidently for years about a select few intimate relationships.187  Because “it is expected 
that [a] testator will exercise his own judgment concerning his relationship with [his would-be] 
donees, their needs, his relationship to them, and the like,” proxy will-making has long been 
considered precisely the type of transaction covered under the nondelegable acts doctrine.188  
Creation of custodial rights over a child has also been viewed as an intimate act unsuitable for 
agency’s application.189  Medical decision-making historically was excluded from the domain of 
agency.  And, of course, taking marriage vows by proxy is not generally tolerated.190   
                                                 
182 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.05 cmt. b (2006). 
183 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 81, 48.  
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 See Fowler, supra note 179, at 1010 (“The basic policy underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some 
decisions should be made personally—or not made at all.”); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.04 (2006).  
187 See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126, 86.  
188 Id. See also Fowler, supra note 179, at 1009.   
189 See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126, 87 (describing consent to an adoption as an act too personal to be done with 
the use of agency). 
190 Id. § 126, 87. 
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With the sole exception of marriage, however, legal thinking on the propriety of agency 
law’s application to each of these intimate relationships has changed drastically in the last thirty 
years.  While once described as “doubtless” nondelegable acts,191 proxy will-making, contracts 
to transfer child custody, and grants of authority to another to make health care decisions are all 
now permissible.  Only marriage remains as an intimate transaction not yet reevaluated under the 
nondelegable acts doctrine. 
A. Will-making by Proxy—a “Notably New Development”192 
 
Much like the contract of marriage, the making of a will “holds a unique and revered 
position in our collective psyche.”193  A will is among the most personal and significant legal 
acts in which a person engages.194  Nonetheless, the use of agents in will-making has long been 
recognized for the purpose of carrying out necessary will formalities.  And in the last twenty 
years, the use of agency principles in the wills context has increased to such a degree that, for the 
first time in history, an agent may even be able to make dispositions, essentially creating an 
entire will, on the testator’s behalf.  The acceptance of proxy will-making has progressed slowly, 
and is continuing still, but it signals a substantial erosion of the theory that agency principles are 
necessarily inappropriate for application to intimate affairs. 
When considering a person’s ability to legally use a proxy in creating a will, the 
distinction between a “proxy signature” and a true “proxy will” must be closely observed.  The 
                                                 
191 Id. § 126, 86–87. 
192 Ralph C. Brashier, Policy, Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C.L. REV. 63, 105 (2009). 
193 Id. at 93. 
194 See In re Estate of Hart, 295 P.2d 985, 1002 (Wyo. 1956) (“It is, and for many centuries has been, a common 
thought in our economic system, that to execute a last will and testament is the most solemn and sacred act of a 
man’s life.”); I.J. Hardinham, The Rule Against Delegation of Will-Making Power, 9 MELB. U. L. REV. 650, 651 
(1974) (“It has been argued that the power to make a will, to exclude next of kin, is a personal privilege which may 
be delegated to no other.”).  
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two have been treated differently for centuries, with the idea of a proxy signature in a will being 
far better accepted.195 
It is often possible that a testator unable to comply with will-making form requirements, 
perhaps because he is physically incapable of signing his will, may use an agent to execute a will 
in proper form.196  Typically, state laws require that the infirm testator signify the instrument at 
issue is, in fact, his testament, and then direct a proxy to sign his name.197  Even the Uniform 
Probate Code, which clearly prefers a will signed by the testator himself, allows a will to be 
signed instead “by some other person in the testator’s presence and by his direction.”198   
Such a proxy transaction differs from proxy marriage in one significant way.  In the wills 
context, the testator himself is present when the agent signs,199 while the very purpose of 
sanctioning proxy marriage is to allow marriages to take place between parties at a distance.200  
Nonetheless, both situations involve nothing more than the legal acceptance of an alternate 
means of complying with a form requirement—typically the signature of two witnesses or 
acknowledgment before a notary in the case of a will,201 and a ceremonial declaration of consent 
                                                 
195 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–502 (YEAR).  
196 See Brashier, supra note 192, at 92. 
197 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1578 (2009). 
198 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008). The Uniform Probate Code has been adopted, at least in part, by 
eighteen states. It has been adopted in its entirety (with some modifications) by the following sixteen states: Alaska, 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.100 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1101 
to 14-7308 (2005 & Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-10-101 to 15-17-102 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 655.82 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 539-1 to -12 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1-101 to 
15-7-307 (2006 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1-101 to 8-401 (1989 & Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 700.1101 to 700.8102 (West 1995 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-101 to 524.8-103 (West 2002 
& Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-1-101 to 72-6-3131 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2201 to -2902 
(1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-1-101 to 45-7-522 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-01-01 to 30.1-35-01 (1996 
& Supp. 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-6-10 to 35-6-100 (1987 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-1-101 to 
29A-8-101 (2004 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-101 to 75-8-101 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).  
199 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–502 (YEAR).  
200 See Moore, supra note 16, at 313 (“[I]t is only during wartime that marriage by proxy is of great utility, since 
only then are a substantial number of lovers forcibly separated for protracted periods.”).  
201 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–502 (1993).  
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in a marriage.202  That the law has sanctioned use of an agent to comply with will formalities 
suggests that the formalities a party must accomplish to enter into the marriage contract should 
be permissibly accomplished with the aid of an agent as well.   
Even more compelling is the recent trend toward applying agency principles to allow a 
person not to merely sign a will on the principal’s behalf, but to actually decide upon 
dispositions for the principal, essentially creating an entire will for him.  Historically, it was 
impossible to create a valid will by proxy.  Roman law dating back to the sixth century rejected 
the practice,203 viewing a will made by anyone other than the testator as a will that could not be 
regarded as the testator’s will at all.204  Agency theory was well-recognized in both early Roman 
and English law;205 it simply was not applied in the wills context.206  Will-making was viewed as 
an “inalienable right” early in the law’s development.207  And many centuries later, that view 
generally persists both in the United States and abroad.208   
                                                 
202 See supra notes 11-12 for ceremonial requirements of marriage.  
203 ROSCOE POUND, READINGS IN ROMAN LAW 26(Lincoln Jacob North & Co. 1906).  
204 See Brashier, supra note 192, at 63–64 n. 2. But cf. MINSHANG FA SHIWU YANJIU: JICHENG JUAN [A STUDY OF 
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE: INHERITANCE VOLUME] 103 (Yang Zhenshan, ed., 1993) (proxy wills 
enforced in China under its courts’ general enforcement of formally defective wills that make dispositions to 
“worthy” family members).  
205 See Tony Weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1615, 1627–28 (1992).  
206 See I.J. Hardingham, The Rule Against Delegation of Will-Making Power, 9 MELB. U.L. REV. 650, 652 (1974) 
(“It would seem to be true to say that, in England at least, the rule is ‘simply a rule that no settlor and no testator 
may by means of either power or trust delegate to others the selection of beneficiaries from a limited but uncertain 
class’ for uncertainty has been the vice in all cases wherein the rule has been applied.”) (citing to I.D. Campbell, The 
Enigma of General Powers of Appointment, 7 RES JUDICATAE 244, 252–53 (1955–57)); POUND, supra note 203, at 
26 (describing authority of “procurator . . . who manages the business of another by authority of his principal”). 
207 See Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 4 (“[E]very person . . . shall have full and free liberty, power and 
authority to give, dispose, will and devise . . . at his free will and pleasure . . . .”); In re Runals’ Estate, 328 N.Y.S. 
2d 966, 976 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1972); In re Nagle’s Estate, 317 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio App. 1974). But see J.C. 
Shepherd, When the Common Law Fails, 9 EST. & TR. J. 117, 129 (1989) (“Over-all, it is important to understand 
that the power to decide on the disposition of your own private property is a power delegated by society to 
individuals as those in the best position to make the most reasonable disposition of the property. It is not some sort 
of inalienable right. Indeed, the whole principle of giving testamentary power to individuals arose during a time 
when only a small portion of one’s private property could be passed on in a discretionary way. The vast majority of 
one’s estate would normally pass by operation of law to one’s heirs, and will-making was often a supplemental 
activity.”) 
208 See, e.g., I.J. Hardingham, The Rule Against Delegation of Will-Making Power, 9 MELB. U. L. REV. 650 (1974) 
(comparative discussion of the rule against delegation of will-making power in England and Australia).  
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However, in seven states, and under the Uniform Probate Code, recent changes allow the 
conservator of an incapacitated person to make a will on the incapacitated’s behalf.209  Though 
the rule applies only in situations involving conservatorship, agency principles are the backbone 
of this legal development.210  A conservator-agent makes a will, on behalf of his principal, when 
the principal is incapacitated and therefore unable to act personally.211 
The idea of a conservator as proxy will maker is a new one.  Conservators hold great 
power to act on behalf of the incapacitated persons they protect.212  But even so, a conservator’s 
power to act on behalf of a protected party has historically excluded will-making authority.  It is 
only in the last twenty years that states have begun to accept the conservator’s making of a will 
for the incapacitated party.213  And as of 2008, the Uniform Probate Code now even sanctions the 
conservator’s power to make, amend, or revoke a will on behalf of a protected person.214   
The theory legitimizing such conduct is one of “substituted judgment.”215  Proxy wills 
made by conservators are said to “reflect a substituted judgment of what the protected person 
would want had he retained capacity . . . .”216  Moreover, the extension of will-making power to 
a conservator has increasingly been deemed necessary as a matter of equity given the breadth of 
                                                 
209 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13) (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-420(8) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 15-14-411(1)(g) (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-411(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7) (West Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-411(a)(9) (West Supp. 2008); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.978(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2003); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7) & (b) (amended 
2008). 
210 See Brashier, supra note 192, at 102–03.  
211 Id. at 92. 
212 Id.  
213 CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13) (West); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-411(g) (); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-
411(a)(7) (West); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7) (West); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-411(a)(9) 
(West); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.078(1)(a) (West); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (West).   
214 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 (amended 2008). 
215 See Brashier, supra note 192, at 87–89.  
216 Id. at 68. More recently, states have gone beyond the substituted judgment doctrine, in the face of much scholarly 
criticism, and approved wills made by conservators if they make reasonable dispositions in the best interest of the 
protected party.” Id. at 88–89. 
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a conservator’s authority.217  Conservators already have the power to dispose of their protected 
persons’ property in a substantial way by engaging in “inter vivos estate planning through will 
substitutes,”218 and thus, granting will-making power to conservators does not represent a severe 
extension of the powers they already hold over the property of the protected person.219  Perhaps 
more importantly, allowing a conservator to draft a will may be the only way to accomplish what 
the incapacitated person needs or clearly desires—whether that is revoking a disposition, 
changing a beneficiary, or creating a will from scratch to avoid the disposition rules of intestate 
succession.220  “Why should a conservator not be able to accomplish directly by will precisely 
what the protected person would have accomplished had she retained testamentary capacity?”221  
Responding sympathetically to that question, the developing trend in state law is to allow proxy 
wills by conservator, with protections to minimize the risk of abuse.222   
Still, the reality of increasing acceptance for proxy will-making by conservators does not 
equate to widespread acceptance of proxy will-making in general.  Outside the conservatorship 
context, when a testator remains fully capable of making his own will, his ability to delegate that 
power to an agent is less clear.  The Uniform Probate Code, which expressly sanctions will-
making by conservator, is silent on the application of agency principles to will-making absent 
                                                 
217 Id. at 68.  
218 Id. at 92. 
219 Id. 
220 Id.  
221 Id. 
222 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 (amended 2008). Section 5-411 states that a conservator may make, amend or 
revoke the protected person’s will after notice is given to interested persons and upon express authorization of the 
court. Not only must the conservator comply with the state’s formalities for executing wills, but the court, in 
deciding whether to approve a conservator’s exercise of the powers listed must consider the decision that the 
protected person would have made and also an enumerated list of factors: “the financial needs of the protected 
person and the needs of individuals who are in fact dependent on the protected person for support and the interest of 
creditors; possible reduction of income, estate, inheritance, or other tax liabilities; eligibility for governmental 
assistance; the protected person’s previous pattern of giving or level of support; the existing estate plan; the 
protected person’s life expectancy and the probability that the conservatorship will terminate before the protected 
person’s death; and any other factors the court considers relevant.” Id.    
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conservatorship.223  The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which provides default rules regarding 
the creation and scope of powers of attorney, likewise takes no stance on proxy will-making by 
agents generally.224   
At least two states have been more explicit.  California legislation provides that “a power 
of attorney may not authorize an attorney-in-fact to make, publish, declare, amend, or revoke the 
principal’s will.225  In Arkansas, an appellate decision stating in dicta that agency doctrine cannot 
support an agent’s making of a will on behalf of the principal describes “the decision of who, 
what, when, and how one’s property is to be distributed upon death” as a personal one that may 
be made only by the testator himself.226  Elsewhere, state law remains mute on proxy will-
making by agent. 
It may well be that will-making by a non-conservator agent is never fully accepted by 
state law, but the recent extension of will-making powers to conservators, which would not have 
been sanctioned in any state twenty years ago, certainly signals a change in our view of will-
making as a task too personal for the application of agency principles.  At least where the 
equities shift in favor of allowing someone other than the testator to make his will because the 
testator can no longer do so himself, concerns over the intimate nature of will making have been 
shoved aside.  One scholar has persuasively argued that the evolution of the law on will-making 
by conservators does, and indeed should, begin to compel movement in state law toward 
accepting wills made through agents more generally.227  As someone “personally selected by the 
protected person and presumably in the best position to know what the protected person would 
desire,” an agent is even better-suited to make a will on his principal’s behalf than is a 
                                                 
223 Brashier, supra note 192, at 102. 
224 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 104 (2006).  
225 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4265 (West 2009). See also Brashier, supra note 192, at 101–02.  
226 In re Estate of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 76 (2003). See also Brashier, supra note 192, at 102. 
227 Brashier, supra note 192, at 102. 
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conservator.228  With protections for the testator—including a requirement that authority to make 
a will be given expressly, perhaps—even proxy will-making by agent may garner more 
widespread approval. 
And even if proxy will-making by agent is never fully accepted, the “notably new 
development” of affording conservators the power to make wills on behalf of the parties they 
protect has significant implications in the marital context.229  The penetration of agency rules 
into will-making, even by conservator, more heavily intrudes into a personal province than does 
the creation of a marriage by proxy.  A conservator or agent making a will for the person he 
represents makes exceptionally detailed and intimate decisions, necessarily identifying objects of 
bounty for the testator and selecting the terms of his dispositions.230  By contrast, an agent in a 
proxy marriage merely carries out the necessary formalities of a contract, the details of which the 
principal has already expressed his approval.  In contrast to the proxy will-maker, then, there is 
no real discretion to be exercised by an agent in the marriage context.  The law’s recognition of 
the need to allow will-making by proxy highlights the logic of also recognizing marriages by 
proxy, particularly because the manner in which an agent is used in proxy marriage and his 
function in that context is comparatively minor and ministerial. 
B. Delegating a Child’s Care, Custody and Control 
The relationship between parent and child is viewed as one of the most sacred formed 
under the law.  The law serves to protect that bond in myriad ways,231 and interference with 
parental decision-making for children must tread lightly or risk trampling a parent’s Troxel-
                                                 
228 Id. at 101. Brashier deftly discusses potential problems raised by the distinction between conservator and agent 
will-making and provides a rationale for extending will-making powers to both groups. Id. at 101–04. 
229 Id. at 105. 
230 See id. at 88–93. 
231 See Michael D. Moberly, Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard:  Advocating the Recognition of a Parent-
Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 515, 538 (2003). 
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recognized constitutional rights.232  The mere fact of a biological link between parents and 
children creates not only parental rights, but also substantial responsibilities.  Parents are 
required to support their children,233 to provide for their care,234 even to educate them235 and to 
more generally foster their wellbeing.236  These duties generally cannot be abdicated237 and the 
government takes Herculean steps to ensure that parents respect the relationship by fulfilling 
their legal responsibilities toward their children.238  The parent-child relationship, then, is most 
certainly a heavily protected one, regulated in large part because of its highly intimate nature.239  
The law of contract would seem to have little application in this intimate context.  But even here, 
agency principles permeate the relationship in a significant way. 
Most notably, agency doctrine encroaches upon the very personal parent-child 
relationship in the custody context.  In every state, custody is viewed through the lens of the best 
interest of the child.240  Natural parents generally exercise custody unless there is a court finding 
                                                 
232 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (although court ordered visitation may be the only way to protect a child 
from severe psychological harm in circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a non-
parent, a Washington statute authorizing court ordered visitation was unconstitutional because it allowed courts to 
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233 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 227 (2009) (“Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract 
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234 See id.  
235 See id.  
236 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 340 
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237 See, e.g., In re Adoption Hoose, 91 S.E.2d 555 (N.C. 1956); In re Adoption of Gates, 85 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio App. 
1948); In re Wilcox Adoption, 349 P.2d 862 (Or. 1960); Whitton v. Scott, 144 A.2d 706 (Vt. 1958). 
238 See e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  See generally LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of 
the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 34 S.D. L. REV. 459, 486–88 (1989) (arguing that despite the law’s rule that 
custody determinations are based on the “best interests of the child,”, both statutes and jurisprudence encourage 
parents in a custody battle to show who is the better parent and not necessarily the best interests of the child.) 
239 See Moberly, supra note 231, at 538. 
240 ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (2007 & Supp. 
2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § _ (West 1986 & Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 728 (2006 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997 & 
Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (2005 & Supp. 2007); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (2006 & Supp. 2008); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); IND. 
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that such an arrangement is not in the child’s best interest.241  And when a non-parent is 
embroiled in a custody dispute with a parent, a court not only considers the child’s best interest, 
but typically must make a finding that custody in a parent would result in substantial harm to the 
child before awarding custody to a non-parent.242  The heightened standard is, again, a function 
of the notion that the parent-child relationship is an important one that must suffer minimal 
intrusion.243  The court serves as gatekeeper of the intimate relationship between parent and 
child.  Even so, in the last fifteen years, the law has begun to rather freely recognize the right of a 
parent to utilize agency principles to confer custody of a minor child, albeit temporarily, to an 
agent. 
Agency principles have begun to apply rather purely, even in the heavily regulated 
custody regime, through doctrines alternatively dubbed “provisional custody by mandate,” 
“custodial power of attorney,” or “standby guardianship.”  In provisional custody by mandate, a 
                                                                                                                                                             
CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-13 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
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ANN. § 767.41 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2007).  
241 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 218 (2009).  
242 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727 (YEAR) (“The Court shall not restrict the rights of a child or a parent 
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community of extended kin.”) (citing to Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce 
and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997–98 (1992)).  
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parent with custody, or both parents if married, designate a mandatary or agent244 to “provide for 
the care, custody, and control of a minor child.”245  The agent’s authority is merely temporary 
under these contractual delegations of custody.246  Louisiana, which has perhaps the most 
detailed statutory scheme, allows a parent to grant custody to an agent by contract for a 
maximum period of one year, and provides that the contract may terminate even earlier for 
prescribed causes, including revocation of agency authority, renunciation by the agent, or a lapse 
of time after the death of the principal.247  Other states’ statutory schemes are less 
comprehensive, but largely provide for the same contractual agency relationship.  In Washington 
D.C., a child’s parent may grant another person a “revocable custodial power of attorney” to 
provide for the child’s care.248  In Pennsylvania, standby guardianship rules—which in most 
states act as a “springing guardianship” to allow a parent to name a guardian for a child who will 
assume authority only upon the parent’s death and after court approval249—extend to permit the 
mere written designation of a standby guardian to take effect immediately upon execution.250 The 
standby guardian can act as the guardian of the minor without the direction of the court for a 
period of sixty days, after which the guardian must file a petition for approval to continue.251 In 
each of these cases, then, parents confer the most sacred of rights to an agent by mere execution 
of a contract and without court oversight or control. 
                                                 
244 Mandate is the civil law’s terminology for the agency contract. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2989 (2009). In the 
mandate relationship, the person to whom authority is conferred is known as the mandatary, and the person 
conferring authority, as in the common law, is called the principal.  Thus, “provisional custody by mandate” is 
nothing more than civilian terminology for the conference of custody by agency contract. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:951 (2008).  
245 Id.  
246 See, e.g., La. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:952 (2008).  
247 Id.  
248 D.C. CODE § 21-2301 (2007).  See also Laura Weinrib, Kinship Care Reform: A Proposal for Consent 
Legislation in Massachusetts, 87 MASS. L. REV. 23, 23 n.6 (2002) (describing power of attorney’s use to 
“accommodate kinship caregivers”). 
249 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502 (West).  
250 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5612 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).   
251 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5613 (West 2001).  
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Parents have used these rules to transfer temporary custody to agents, most frequently 
grandparents and aunts,252 for a variety of reasons ranging from illness and hospitalization to 
military deployments overseas to changes of residency for purposes of enrolling in a better 
public school.253  And while the conference of rights and duties so serious as those inherent in 
the parent-child relationship may seem inappropriately delegated through simple contract, the 
law recognizes such transfers out of perceived necessity.  No other legal device allows a parent 
to retain custody, and thereby avoid relinquishing it entirely on a permanent basis, and yet still 
provide for the care of a child when she cannot do so, or perhaps does not wish to do so. 
Once again, equity permits the intrusion of agency principles into a bond perhaps even 
more intimate than that between spouses.  Agency is even used in this context to create a 
relationship whereby a person exercises care, custody and control over a minor child.   
Logic and consistency compel a re-evaluation of the creation of a marital relationship 
through agency as well.  Such a re-evaluation is particularly appropriate considering that an 
agent exercising custody makes many significant and repeated decisions for the child’s welfare, 
typically unguided by the wishes of the principal.  In the proxy marriage context, by contrast, the 
proxy makes no significant choices on behalf of the principal.  The decision to enter into the 
marital relationship is made even before the proxy’s appointment and the proxy’s role is merely 
to serve as a stand-in to fulfill a form requirement.  If agency has application in creating far more 
significant and personal custodial relationships, it should apply to create spousal relationships as 
well. 
                                                 
252 See Lenore M. Molee, The Ultimate Demonstration of Love for a Child: Choosing a Standby Guardian New 
Jersey Standby Guardianship Act, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 475, 496 (1998) (citing to Carol Levine et al., In Whose 
Care and Custody? Placements and Policies for Children Whose Parents Die of AIDS, Final Report to the United 
Hospital Fund (The Orphan Project, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 7, 1994, at 4) (recommending that custodial parent 
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253 Greg Garland, Pointe Coupee to amend enrollment, THE ADVOCATE, May 12, 2009, at 2B. 
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C. Death by Agent 
At common law, it has been frequently observed that “no right is held more sacred, or is 
more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others. . . .”254  The right to autonomy over 
one’s body is rooted in a constitutional right of privacy, and has been held to extend to freedom 
in approving of or rejecting medical treatment.255  Consistent with that right, American courts in 
the last thirty years have begun to recognize an individual’s right not only to make medical 
decisions for himself, but to appoint an agent for the purpose, even where the decision-making 
involves critical questions implicating life and death. 
Legal recognition of the applicability of agency principles in medical decision-making 
has come about rather slowly.  Traditionally, agency doctrine could not apply to most health care 
situations in which it was truly needed.  An agency relationship at common law terminated 
automatically at the incapacity of the principal.256  And the help of another in engaging in 
medical decision-making is typically needed only when the interested party himself is 
incapacitated such that his is unable to personally make those decisions.257  As a result, prior 
agency appointments were virtually useless in conveying decision-making authority for critical 
health care matters.258  That result wasn’t viewed as exceptionally problematic to scholars in the 
early twentieth century, however, as there was much speculation at the time that “medical 
                                                 
254 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
255 Fowler, supra note 179, at 988–89. 
256 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 677, 480. For a justification of this rule, see Id. § 676, 480 (“The act of every agent 
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257 Fowler, supra note 179, at 1012 n. 174.  
258 Id. at 1014–15. 
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decision-making might fall within [the] narrow category of actions too personal to be 
delegated.”259   
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the power of attorney was gradually revolutionized to 
allow agency authority to persist beyond the principal’s incapacity.260  States, and even the 
Uniform Probate Code in 1969, began to recognize the “durable power of attorney,” durable in 
the sense that it would last past the incapacity of the principal and up to the moment of his 
death.261  Such a power of attorney could, in accordance with the state law and the desires of the 
principal, either come into effect immediately upon execution or “spring” into effect upon the 
occurrence of a triggering event such as the principal’s incapacity,262 without the need for any 
court approval or proceeding.263  In either event, the durable power of attorney was a useful 
extension of traditional common law agency principles because it allowed the agent to continue 
to act with respect to the principal’s affairs—managing his finances and buying and selling 
property—when the principal was unable to do so himself.  As a result, the durable power of 
attorney has long been viewed as a logical and equitable extension of agency law insofar as it 
gives a trusted person exercising substituted judgment the authority to act in a manner that the 
principal likely would have desired.264  By 1984, the durable power of attorney was a part of the 
law in all fifty states.265   
The clear extension of the durable power of attorney to medical decision-making, 
however, has come about more slowly as a result of the perception that the authority to make life 
                                                 
259 Id. at 1009. 
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261 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501 (1969 amended 2008).  
262 Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm—The Durable Power of Attorney—Planned Protective Services and the 
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263 Id. 
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265 Fowler, supra note 179, at 1009. 
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and death decisions on behalf of another might just be a “nondelegable” act outside the ambit of 
agency law.266  The concern, of course, is that the power the agent wields in these circumstances 
is “extraordinary”267 and “the basic policy underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some 
decisions should be made personally—or not made at all.”268  Even in the wake of the creation of 
the durable power of attorney, agency scholars and lawyers questioned whether health care 
decisions were of the sort that just should not be made at all if they could not be made by the 
affected person himself.269 
Today, the power of attorney has evolved such that it is clear it may be used as a device 
to permit the appointment of an agent for medical decision-making.270  Despite the intimate 
nature of the choices made by the agent in the face of the principal’s incapacity, the right to 
make such choices is now widely recognized as falling within agency authority.271  The history 
of the durable power of attorney itself helped states to reach that conclusion.  It is evident from 
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271 See supra note 260.  
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writings of the committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
charged with drafting a model durable power of attorney law that the purpose of its creation was 
to provide incompetents with “assistance in caring for their property rights or personal affairs, or 
for protecting their property or personal rights.”272  Slowly, the view has come to predominate 
that the drafters of durable power of attorney statutes must have contemplated the making of 
health care decisions as precisely one of those acts for which authority could be, and most often 
would be, conveyed to an agent.273   
There is no doubt that the decisions made by an agent under a durable power of attorney, 
at least with regard to the health care of the principal, are complex and personal.  The agent 
needs to “assess risks and costs, speak to friends and relatives…, consider a variety of 
therapeutic options, seek the opinions of other physicians, evaluate the … condition and 
prospects for recovery”—in short, make exactly the kind of tough choices the principal himself 
would be required to make absent the power of attorney.274  Still, the law has come to recognize 
the principal’s right to select a proxy to speak for him in making life and death decision.  Where 
the charge placed upon the agent would be much less severe—merely carrying out a form 
requirement rather than making critical decisions—the same possibilities should be extended to 
principals desiring to perfect ceremonial marriage requirements by proxy. 
III. THE EVOLVING CASE FOR PROXY MARRIAGE275 
 
A. Equitable Necessity in the Twenty-First Century 
                                                 
272 Fowler, supra note 179, at 1016 (citing to Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests Act, 
reprinted in NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL 
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273 See HANDBOOK, supra note 272, at 275.  
274 Fowler, supra note 179, at 1001. 
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The legality of proxy marriage certainly seems to be nothing more than an academic 
inquiry.  After all, marrying with the use of representatives is exceptionally unromantic.276  And 
in an age in which marriage is viewed almost exclusively as the outcome of romantic love,277 one 
might assume that so few couples would choose to marry by proxy that its legality would be 
almost irrelevant.  In fact, precisely the opposite is true.  Contemporary demand for proxy 
marriage is startlingly strong, brought about in large part by the many advantages afforded to 
married persons that their unmarried counterparts do not share. 
1. The Groups Which Stand to Benefit From Proxy Marriage 
In Montana, the only American state to allow marriages by double proxy,278 county 
officials were so overwhelmed with proxy marriage applications—nearly thirty per month in 
Flathead County alone—that they changed state law in 2007 to restrict proxy marriage to 
situations in which one spouse is either a Montana resident or member of the armed forces.279 
County clerks complained that they simply could not otherwise handle the sheer volume of proxy 
marriage requests.280  The change may not have brought about its intended effect.  Three years 
later, even with a very narrow proxy marriage rule, Montana officials in Flathead County report 
that they process as many as eighty double proxy marriages each month.281 
Demand for proxy marriage among American citizens is strong, brought about, in large 
part, by the sheer number of armed forces stationed away from home.  That number approached 
                                                 
276 See Jennifer H. Svan, Married in Montana: Servicemembers Take Advantage of State’s Double-Proxy Law, 
STARS AND STRIPES, May 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.stripes.com/articleprint.asp?section=104&article=62928.  
277 See COTT, supra note 87, at 150.  
278 MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2007).  
279 Maurice Possley, Marriage by Proxy Booming in Montana, MONTANA LAWYER 32 (June/July 2007).  
280 Id.  
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300,000 in 2008.282  And while at first blush that figure seems to pale in comparison with the 
four million men serving in the armed forces in World War I, the lengthy duration of America’s 
continued occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq makes the number of troops who have served 
abroad in the last decade approximate that when proxy marriage was viewed as a necessity. 
Of course, military personnel are not the only group for whom proxy marriage might be 
an attractive option.  Any couple separated by a substantial distance might find the doctrine 
useful.  In fact, the history of Montana’s proxy marriage law demonstrates that it grew not out of 
a demand among members of the armed forces, but rather from miners populating the area in the 
1860s, who typically came from out of state and desired to wed their “far-flung fiancées.”283  
Today, and particularly in the current troubled economy, far more Americans are forced to seek 
employment and remain far from home or their significant others for a lengthy period.284  
Thousands of American citizens find themselves in such a situation, and while the number of 
those persons desiring to perfect a proxy marriage is certainly just a small fraction of those who 
work away from home, modern employment conditions have no doubt significantly bolstered 
demand for proxy marriage as a result of increasing long-distance employment over the last 
century.285 
Finally, the number of same sex individuals in committed relationships, who often desire 
the rights and responsibilities of marriage, and who might take advantage of proxy rules in a 
state allowing same sex marriage, has also increased dramatically since proxy marriage was born 
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in this country.286  In the 1920s and 1930s, a gay and lesbian culture was just beginning to take 
hold in the United States.287  Today, there are reportedly 710,000 acknowledged homosexual 
Americans288 and the 2010 census figures are expected to report a substantial increase in the 
number of those persons involved in committed relationships.289  Because gay and lesbian 
couples can only legally marry in a few American jurisdictions, their only option for perfecting a 
valid marriage is to endure the hardship of traveling to a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex 
marriage and does not restrict its application to residents.290 
Constituents of all of the above-described groups are likely to desire to marry by proxy at 
levels not yet seen before, stemming from the fact that they cannot perfect a ceremonial 
marriage.  The availability of the proxy marriage option would confer a panoply of advantages 
no other legal status can bring, both to the spouses themselves and to their children.291 
2. The Benefits of Proxy Marriage 
Perhaps foremost among the rights a party might seek through a proxy marriage are 
immigration benefits.  A controversial English case which recently made headlines provides an 
instructive example.  Two English residents, a Polish citizen and a Brazilian citizen, were 
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married by double proxy in Brazil while they remained in London.292  The marriage made the 
Brazilian husband the spouse of a European Union citizen, thus conferring upon him the right to 
remain in England permanently.293  British immigration officials acknowledged the validity of 
the couple’s proxy marriage in Brazil, but argued it was used in this case to circumvent English 
immigration policy,294 which would have denied immigration effects to a marriage perfected in 
England because the intended husband was in the country on only a temporary visitor’s visa.295  
Immigration officials essentially bemoaned the spouses taking advantage of what they described 
as a “loophole” in immigration policy by engaging in a proxy marriage.296  When the husband 
was denied resident status, he sued, arguing that a refusal to grant him UK residency violated his 
human rights.  A lower court immigration judge agreed, and the House of Lords ended the 
controversy when it ruled in late 2008 that further investigating the motives of the couple’s 
Brazilian proxy marriage would be a breach of their human rights.297  The parties to this proxy 
marriage insist that their marriage is “genuine,” “not a sham,” and that they strongly desired to 
marry but simply could not bear the cost and complication of traveling to Poland or Brazil to do 
so.298  Proxy marriage was their only option, and an option that conferred substantial 
immigration advantages on the husband. 
                                                 
292 See Dan Newling, The wedding with no bride and no groom as Brazilian marries Pole “by Proxy” to stay in 
Britain, MailOnline.com, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1094306/The-
wedding-bride-groom-Pole-Brazilian-marry-proxy-stay-Britain.html.  
293 Id.  
294 Id. 
295 Visitors of the UK are not permitted to apply for a visa on the basis of marriage if not a European citizen, not 
married to a person present, and not settled in the UK. See Marriage Visa, workpermit.com, available at 
http://www.workpermit.com/uk/marriage.htm.   
296 Newling, supra note 292.  
297 Id.  
298 Id.  
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In a high profile case closer to home, an American resident claimed permanent resident 
status based on a proxy marriage to a deceased Marine.299  Hotaru Ferschke is a Japanese citizen 
who married an American serviceman by proxy in Japan after he deployed for service in Iraq and 
she learned she was pregnant with his child.300  One month after the proxy marriage, Ferschke’s 
husband was killed during a house raid in Iraq.301  Ferschke sought to obtain permanent 
residency in the United States for herself and her son, as the spouse and child of an American 
citizen.302  The federal government denied her request because the parties’ marriage was 
perfected by proxy.  And while the United States government recognizes, for immigration 
purposes, proxy marriages valid in the jurisdiction in which they were contracted,303 it imposes 
the additional requirement of consummation before a proxy marriage can confer immigration 
status.304  Because Ferschke and her husband did not live together or engage in sexual activity 
after their marriage, she was denied permanent residency.305  Immigration officials have 
expressed distress over the case, noting the sacrifices of Ferschke’s family for this country, but 
believe the law allows no other outcome.306  Ferschke sought the help of three United States 
Congressmen, who introduced a private bill to aid her.  But Congress has taken no action on the 
bill thus far, and Ferschke’s status remains unresolved.  She returned to Japan in January of 
2010.307 
                                                 
299 See Kristin M. Hall, Proxy wedding means Marine’s widow, baby unwelcome, knoxnews.com, Sept. 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2009/sep/17/proxy-wedding-means-marines-widow-baby-
unwelcome/.  
300 Id.  
301 Id.  
302 Id.  
303 See Immigration Law & Family § 4:13 (2009).  
304 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2005).  Some states, even outside the immigration context, require consummation of a 
marriage on penalty of nullity.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1 (1933). 
305 Hall, supra note 299.  
306 Id.  
307 Robert Norris, Marine widow Ferschke and son, ‘Mikey,’ return to Japan, thedailytimes.com, Jan. 6, 2010, 
available at http://www.thedailytimes.com/article/20100106/NEWS/301069985.   
 50
It is obvious from the Ferschke story that not all attempts to use proxy marriage to obtain 
immigration advantages are successful.  Still, the two stories together demonstrate well the 
potential advantages of a proxy marriage to better the immigration status of foreign residents, 
often in deserving cases.   
In addition to immigration status, marriage confers a staggering array of property rights 
upon the parties to it.  The right to succeed from a deceased spouse who leaves no will,308 the 
right to an elective share when a spouse dies with a will,309 life insurance benefits, pension 
payments, health insurance coverage, and a whole host of other entitlements are given to spouses 
alone.310  In the military context, there are a number of more particular advantages provided to 
spouses of active duty armed forces, particularly when they are killed in combat.311  For instance, 
the United States government pays a “death gratuity” of $100,000 to the surviving spouse of a 
member of the armed forces who dies on active duty.312  Both inside and outside the military 
context, then, marriage provides substantial property entitlements to its parties.  And when they 
are unable to undergo a ceremonial marriage because of impossibility or exceptional 
inconvenience, proxy marriage is the only means of conferring the advantages of marriage that 
both parties so desire. 
                                                 
308 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–102 (amended 2006). 
309 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2–202 (amended 2006).  
310 See infra note 300. 
311 Spouses of military servicemembers are entitled to the following benefits: Death Gratuity (a one-time non-
taxable payment to help surviving family members deal with the financial hardships that accompany the loss of a 
servicemember); Veteran’s Death Pension (pension for surviving spouses of deceased veterans); Dependency and 
Indemnity Compensation (a monthly benefit paid to eligible survivors of certain deceased veterans); Survivors’ and 
Dependents’ Education Assistance Program (provides education and training opportunities to eligible dependents of 
certain veterans; offers up to forty-five months of education benefits; benefits may be used for degree and certificate 
programs, apprenticeship, and on-the-job training); Gold Star Lapel Button (widows and widowers entitled to Gold 
Lapel Button); Survivor Health and Dental Benefits (surviving spouses can continue to receive health and dental 
benefits); TRICARE Eligibility (a health benefit program). See Understanding Survivor Benefits,  
http://www.military.com/benefits/survivor-benefits/.  
312 See Death Gratuity, http://www.military.com/benefits/survivor-benefits/death-gratuity.  
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Finally, children may have much at stake in the recognition of their parents’ proxy 
marriage.  While children born both inside and outside of marriage are now generally 
recognized, on constitutional grounds, to have the same rights and duties vis-à-vis their 
parents,313 the ease with which they may assert these rights still differs based on their parents’ 
marital status.314  Children born during the marriage of their parents, or within a reasonable 
period after the dissolution of their parents’ marriage, enjoy a legal presumption of filiation.315  
The child born to a married American servicemember on duty overseas, for instance, would not 
have to suffer the expense and inconvenience of proving paternity before receiving legal 
recognition as the servicemember’s descendant.  The law would presume him the 
servicemember’s son, and treat him as such unless and until a party with a contrary interest 
proved otherwise.316  But the protections of a filiative presumption depend upon marriage of the 
child’s parents.  And again, when parents are unable to perfect a ceremonial marriage, a proxy 
marriage may be the only means of creating presumptions that aid children in establishing the 
parent-child relationship. 
In short, the need for a narrow doctrine legalizing proxy marriage is great, brought about 
by a more geographically diverse society.  Law and policy makers must recognize that a 
changing culture demands a new look at whether rules which exclude the use of agents in the 
marriage ceremony continue to effect equity in the twenty-first century. 
B. The Protective Mechanisms of the Power of Attorney 
                                                 
313 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that a provision of the Illinois Probate Act which allowed 
children born outside of marriage to inherit by intestate succession from their mothers only, although children born 
of a marriage may inherit by intestate succession from both parents, denies equal protection to children born outside 
of marriage). 
314 But see http://www.military/com/benefits/tricare/tricare-elibility (some military health insurance benefits may be 
available to children born outside of marriage). 
315 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2009).  
316 Id.  
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Perhaps one of the most significant obstacles that has prevented American courts and 
legislatures from widely recognizing the validity of proxy marriages all these years is nothing 
more than fear.  Fear of the limitations of agency to effect justice in an intimate context is 
palpable.  As one scholar has noted, “there is always the possibility that an agent will make an 
irrational decision that needlessly” harms the principal.317  Fear of the application of agency 
principles to the marriage contract should not overshadow the potential for equitable gains, 
however.  General agency law includes a multitude of mechanisms designed to protect both 
principals and agents, which are particularly helpful when analyzed in the marital context.  
Moreover, the basic principles of agency can be slightly tailored with little difficulty where 
necessary to better fit the marriage contract.  Essentially, by divesting the proxy of nearly all 
discretion and requiring exceptional specificity in a writing creating the agency relationship, a 
regime can be created which permits proxy marriage, but at the same time allays the fears which 
have posed hurdles to its recognition for so many years. 
1. The Straightjacket of Form 
As a general matter, agency relationships need not be created in writing.318  The 
principal-agent relationship, which is a contractual one, may come about by mere oral 
agreement,319 or perhaps even tacitly.320  Nonetheless, the law has long recognized the need for 
more solemnity in the creation of an agency relationship for certain significant transactions.321  
The common law “equal dignity rule” serves to appropriately regulate the form necessary for a 
document creating an agency relationship by requiring the power of attorney to be in writing if a 
                                                 
317 Fowler, supra note 179, at 1005. 
318 See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.02 (2006).  
319 See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.01 (2006). 
320 See id.  
321 The power of attorney is the “written instrument by which one person . . . confirms the authority of another to 
perform specified actions on [his] behalf.” Fowler, supra note 179, at 1013–14. It is not a prerequisite to the creation 
of an agency relationship, but is “serves as objective manifestation to third parties that such an agency has been 
created.” Id. at 1014.   
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writing is required for the underlying transaction for which the agent is given authority to act.322  
Therefore, a power of attorney to alienate property on behalf of the principal or bind the 
principal as a surety must be in writing and must expressly confer authority to undertake specific 
action rather than generally grant the agent responsibility for handling all the affairs of the 
principal.323  Some states have gone beyond the pure common law formulation of the equal 
dignity rule to require that the agency contract not only be in writing, but in whatever particular 
form is required of the underlying transaction.324  Still others require particular types of agency 
contracts to assume the law’s highest form requirements; the durable power of attorney, for 
instance, frequently must be executed before a notary and two witnesses.325 
In the marriage context, application of the most restrictive equal dignity rule would lead 
to absurd results.  Requiring a power of attorney for a proxy marriage to be perfected before a 
qualified officiant, typically a religious official or judicial officer,326 for instance, makes little 
sense.  The law has recognized as much in the corporate context or “when an agent acts only as 
an amanuensis who signs at the principal’s request,” where the equal dignity doctrine has been 
set aside as illogical.327   
                                                 
322 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.02 (2006); see also Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Representation, Mandate & Agency:  A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1122 (1999). 
323 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.92 (2006).  
324 Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 322, at 1122. 
325 Richard C. Milstein, Florida Wills (For Modest Estates), Powers of Attorney, and Health Care Advance 
Directives, THE FLORIDA BAR (2007). 
326 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:202 (2008) (“A marriage ceremony may be performed by (1) priest, minister, 
rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the 
authorities of his religion to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or 
justice of the peace.”). 
327 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.02 (2006). For example, corporate officers are agents who enter into 
transactions on behalf of the corporation. However, corporate officers typically are granted authority to act on the 
corporation’s behalf in the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or a board resolution. It would thus, be illogical and 
cumbersome to apply the equal dignity doctrine and require an individual writing granting authority for nearly every 
act undertaken by the agent. See id.  
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Still, the evidentiary and cautionary functions of ceremonial marriage requirements328 
could be served by requiring that a power of attorney to marry be executed in writing, at a 
minimum.  Requiring even more—the presence of a notary or witnesses—would also be 
consistent with agency principles in the intimate area of the durable power of attorney329 and 
would be a reasonable demand to make of those desiring to perfect a proxy marriage.330   
2. Specificity and Duration Limitations 
Form requirements aside, a number of foreign jurisdictions which sanction proxy 
marriage have imposed additional mandates on a power of attorney to marry which the United 
States could borrow in a manner consistent with American agency principles.  Most central and 
south American countries, for example, require that the “other party to the marriage . . . be 
clearly and unmistakably designated by name in the document appointing the proxy [and] that 
the marriage can be concluded with this person only and with nobody else . . . .”331  Other 
jurisdictions require a specification of the “place, day, and hour designated for the celebration of 
the marriage.”332  Some countries even limit the maximum duration of a power of attorney to 
                                                 
328 See John H. Wade, Void and De Facto Marriages, 9 SYDNEY L. REV. 356, 360 (1981) (“Courts dealing with 
property disputes had for centuries before 1753 suggested that a ceremonial marriage was far easier to prove in court 
than merely a de facto one. Thus then, as today, formalized marriages were especially desirable for evidentiary 
reasons.  But ethics certainly played a subsidiary role in the emergence of the legal requirement of the ceremony. 
For public ceremony hopefully gave time for reflection about the serious nature of marriage, perhaps delayed 
impulsive passion, scared off fortune hunters in search of heiresses, and allowed time for social approval and 
advice.”). But see D.E. Engdahl, Medieval Metaphysics and English Marriage Law, 8 J. FAM. L. 381, 382 (1968) 
(arguing that validity requirements in marriage laws are often barriers to justice).  
329 See Milstein, supra note 325. 
330 Mexican law currently requires that a grant of agency authority to marry be made before a notary and two 
witnesses. C.C.F. art. 44 (2002).  
331 Schwelb, supra note 34, at 368. But see id (describing Islamic law, wherein the proxy is given authority even to 
choose the bride for the principal). 
332 See FAM. C. art. 47 (2008), in FAMILY CODE OF PANAMA 294–95 (trans. by Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence 
Publishing Co., 2009) (“Marriage can be contracted by the appearance before the official and two witnesses, without 
legal impediment, by one of the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of 
attorney, by notarial act; provided that the person that is domiciled or is a resident at the place of officiating of the 
official that is to celebrate the marriage is always necessary. The power of attorney must express the name of the 
person with whom the marriage is to be performed, and basic informational facts for identifying the person, and the 
marriage shall be valid unless the revocation of the power of attorney has been given to the empowered agent, in due 
form, prior to the celebration of the marriage.”); C.C.F. art. 102 (2002), in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO 17 
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marry to a relatively short period.333  In Italy, for instance, a proxy marriage must be celebrated 
within 180 days of the grant of agency authority.334  Such specificity and duration restrictions 
would allow American courts to recognize the equitable need for proxy marriage, while at the 
same time limiting the breadth of the authority granted to the agent. 
3. The Possibility of Revocation 
Principles of revocation, which may arise in any agency contract, can also play a role in 
protecting principals to proxy marriages.  An agency contract is typically revocable at the will of 
the principal,335 and this general rule should apply in the marital context as well.  Indeed, 
scholars have long observed that the revocable nature of the power of attorney is a consideration 
which strongly militates against legally recognizing proxy marriage.336  The worry is that the 
ability of the principal to revoke his proxy’s authority at any time may result in marriages which 
do not meet with the principal’s changed desires.337   
Agency law is already well equipped to deal with the familiar problem of revocation, 
however.  Because a revocation may have substantial effects on third parties, it is not effective in 
withdrawing the agent’s authority until the agent receives notice of the revocation.338  The 
burden placed upon the principal is slight—he must simply communicate his change of heart to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(trans. Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence Publishing Co., 2003) (“The parties or their specially empowered agents, 
constituted in the manner provided in Article 44, as well as two witnesses to each of the parties that verify their 
identity, must be present before the Civil Registry judge at the place, day and hour designated for the celebration of 
the marriage. . . .”). 
 This form of regulation is not wholly unknown to American law, as agency theorists have long 
distinguished between “general agents” and “special agents,” the latter being authorized to conduct only a single 
transaction on the principal’s behalf.  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01 cmt. d (2006). 
333 See CÓD. CIV. art. 172 (2001), in CIVIL CODE OF ARGENTINA 37 (trans. by Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence 
Publishing Co., 2008) (“Marriage at a distance is one in which the absentee party expresses his consent before the 
competent authority to officiate at marriage ceremonies at the place where he is. The documentation verifying the 
absentee’s consent can only be offered within ninety days of the date when it was granted.”). 
334 C.C. art. 111 (2004).  See also THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION (trans. by Mario 
Beltramo, Giovanni E. Longo, John H. Merryman) (1991). 
335 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.06 (2006). 
336 See Apt v. Apt, [1948] P. 83; Recent Cases, 10 B.U. L. REV. 378, 403 (1930). 
337 52 AM. JUR. 2d Marriage § 15 (2009). 
338 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.10 (2006). 
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the principal before the hour he designated for his act arrives.339  In the marital context, the 
application of this general rule adequately protects the principal, who would be bound only to 
marriages to which he specifically consented and which were contracted before he gave his duly 
appointed agent notice of his changed intent. 
4. The Discretionless Power of Attorney 
The confines of American agency law are, in all of the ways set out above, already well-
designed to serve the parties to a proxy marriage.  The specificity that could be required in the 
power of attorney and the fact that all the agent really does is stand-in to meet a form 
requirement really means the proxy in a proxy marriage is not a proxy, or true agent, at all.  “The 
proxy is . . . nothing but a messenger, a ‘porte-parole,’ ‘nuntius,’ ‘Bote.’”340  He has no authority 
whatsoever to inject himself into the legal sphere of the party who appointed him.  The proxy’s 
own will does not enter into the picture.”341  The role of the proxy and the power of attorney’s 
protective mechanisms provide comfort, then, in ensuring that entry into one of the law’s most 
intimate relationships is made by will and intention of the principal himself.  And because the 
law already sanctions the application of agency principles in other intimate areas—including 
will-making, transferring child custody, and creating durable powers of attorney—all of which 
                                                 
339 Spain’s proxy marriage legislation provides a contemporary example of the application of agency revocation 
principles in the marital context. C.C. art. 87 (YEAR), in CLIFFORD STEVENS WILSON, THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND 
SPANISH-AMERICA: INCLUDING CUBA, PUERTO RICO AND PHILIPPINE ISLAND 141 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 
2003) (agency power “shall be valid if, before [the marriage’s] celebration, the person so authorized should not have 
been notified in an authentic form of the revocation of power”). 
340 Schwelb, supra note 34, at 368. “Porte-parole” is French for “spokesman, mouthpiece.” See J.E. MANSION, 
HARRAP’S NEW STANDARD FRENCH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Pt.1, Vol. 2, P:77 (R.P.L. Ledesert & Margaret 
Ledesert, eds.) (1973). “Nuntius” is Latin for “messenger, bearer of news.” See LEXICON OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE 
578 (F.P. Leverett, ed.) (1850). “Bote” is German for “messenger, courier, bearer.” See CASSELL’S GERMAN–
ENGLISH ENGLISH–GERMAN DICTIONARY 126 (revised by Harold T. Betteridge) (1978). 
341 Schwelb, supra note 34, at 368. 
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give the agent substantially more decision-making authority,342 the modest role of an agent in a 
proxy marriage should be easily tolerated. 
IV. TOWARD A WEDDING WITH NO BRIDE AND NO GROOM343 
 
Proxy marriage fails to conform well to today’s wedding fairy tale.  It requires no white 
dress, no fancy flowers or cake, and no limousine to carry the new bride and groom into their 
future.344  At best, it’s a wholly unromantic way to perfect the contract of marriage.  Nonetheless, 
it is a useful, even necessary, avenue to marriage for many couples who want undertake the 
lifetime of rights and duties associated with marriage but are unable to fulfill typical ceremonial 
marriage requirements. 
Fear and consternation associated with a departure from strict adherence to the 
requirements of traditional, ceremonial marriage is misplaced.  By allowing common law 
marriage, the law in many American jurisdictions has already gone rather far in creating inroads 
to the requirement that a marriage be celebrated formally with both spouses physically present in 
the same room at the same time.345  Allowing spouses to celebrate a marriage with the assistance 
of agents is perhaps even less troubling, particularly considering that the law already sanctions 
the use of agents in other intimate transactions such as will-making, transferring child custody, 
and even making end-of-life decisions.  In fact, we often view agency law as designed to do 
precisely what we fear in the marriage context, namely, allow the principal to authorize an agent 
to act for him in a significant, often personal, transaction.346 
                                                 
342 See supra Part II. 
343 Inspiration for this title was drawn from Newling, supra note 292. 
344 But see Dan Barry, Trading Vows in Montana, No Couple Required, N.Y. TIMES March 10, 2008 (describing the 
“sugary vows written by the absentee bride and groom” that two Montana proxies once delivered to each other). 
345 See supra note 9. 
346 Fowler, supra note 179, at 1016 (describing the creation of a national committee to study ways in which a power 
of attorney might aid individuals in managing their most personal affairs).  
 58
Creating symmetry in agency law by sanctioning proxy marriage is simply the next 
logical step in the evolution of agency principles as applied to intimate relationships.  It is a step 
that can be taken confidently given that the agent in a proxy marriage may be given far less 
discretion and decision-making responsibility than he is afforded in other personal dealings, and 
given the strong foundation of protection that American agency rules already affords principals 
through form requirements, duration restrictions, and revocation rules.  In short, agency 
principles are ripe for application to the contract of marriage, and the idea of a proxy marriage—
a groomless, perhaps even brideless wedding—should be embraced. 
